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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE TWO COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTIES

OR BASSOK*
ABSTRACT
In recent years, the countermajoritarian difficulty has split into two.
According to its traditional version, the difficulty arises when unaccountable
Justices strike down statutes passed by electorally accountable branches of
government. According to the newer, literal version, the difficulty arises when
Justices strike down statutes that are supported by the majority according to
public opinion polls. By explicating the difference between the two versions of
the difficulty, I expose the deep influence of public opinion polls on American
constitutional thought. For many years, scholars conflated the two difficulties
under one banner and offered normative justifications for the Court’s
countermajoritarian authority. In recent years, many constitutional theorists,
oriented toward social science, attempt to dissolve the literal
countermajoritarian difficulty by showing that the Court is not countering the
majority will but following it. I further demonstrate that the distinction helps
to explain four additional issues of constitutional theory. First, this distinction
explains the connection between the countermajoritarian difficulty and the
“passive virtues” technique that Alexander Bickel devised for the Court.
Second, it exposes the importance of the distinction between cases that the
media covers and non-visible cases. Third, it sheds new light on the basis of
the Court’s power.
Finally, this distinction is crucial for a better
understanding of a puzzle that stands at the heart of the rise of judicial power
worldwide.

* Robina Foundation Visiting Human Rights Fellow, Yale Law School; LL.M, Yale Law School;
LL.M & LL.B, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I am extremely grateful to Bruce Ackerman,
Jack Balkin, Paul Kahn and Robert Post for many illuminating discussions and thoughtful
comments. I wish also to thank Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Robert Burt, Yoav Dotan, Noam Y.
Finger, James E. Fowkes, Alon Harel, Shay Levi, Han Liu, Lucas Mac-Clure, Itamar J. MannKanowitz, Fernando L. Munoz, Erin L. Miller, Iddo Porat, and participants at the 2011 Yale Law
School Doctoral Scholarship Conference and the College of Management Law School faculty
workshop for helpful comments on earlier drafts. All mistakes are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
The countermajoritarian (hereinafter “CM”) difficulty is changing. Long
before Alexander Bickel conceptualized the problem and gave it its catchy
name,1 the tension between constitutionalism and democracy was understood
to arise from the authority of unaccountable judges to invalidate legislation
enacted by electorally accountable representatives.2 This conceptualization of
the CM difficulty, to which I refer as “traditional,” has obsessed American
legal academia for decades.3 The main tactic for tackling it has been to
propose justifications for the Court’s CM authority.4
Following the invention of scientific public opinion polls and especially
with the rise of “public-opinion culture,”5 a second understanding of the CM
difficulty has emerged. According to this literal understanding, the difficulty
arises when the Court decides to invalidate legislation that enjoys the support
of the majority of the population, as captured by public opinion polls before
the decision or shortly thereafter.6 The “literal” nature of this formulation of
the difficulty is embedded in the premise that “majority will” is scientifically
measured by public opinion polls. Scholars find this premise controversial, yet

1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).

2. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 342–43 (1998) (acknowledging “some
limited countermajoritarian criticism in virtually every era in American history”); Robert W.
Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 845, 846
(2001) (“Bickel was certainly not the first to express concern about judicial review, nor the first to
associate that difficulty with the nondemocratic nature of the courts.”).
3. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 2, at 334 (“The ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ has been
the central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship.”); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme
Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 104 (“[I]t is not wrong to
characterize American legal thought as ‘obsessed’ with the moral problem of judicial review.”).
4. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 659 (2011) (“[T]he leading question in constitutional
theory for generations has been how to justify constitutional limitations on the authority of
democratic majorities given our background commitments to popular sovereignty and selfgovernment—the infamous ‘countermajoritarian difficulty.’”).
5. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75
(2010) (“Right or wrong, decades of polling have had a profound impact on the public mind.”);
SUSAN HERBST, NUMBERED VOICES: HOW OPINION POLLING HAS SHAPED AMERICAN POLITICS
12 (1993) (“Quantitative surveys, both scientific and unscientific, are now a pervasive component
of public discourse . . . .”).
6. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2596, 2596 (2003) (“There is a regrettable lack of clarity in the relevant scholarship about what
‘countermajoritarian’ actually means. At bottom it often seems to be a claim, and perhaps must
be a claim, that when judges invalidate governmental decisions based upon constitutional
requirements, they act contrary to the preferences of the citizenry. Some variation on this premise
seems to drive most normative scholarship regarding judicial review.”).
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it is undisputed in the public discourse where polls’ results are presented as the
will of the people.7 While justifications of the Court’s CM authority are
usually formulated in a manner that allows them to confront the literal version
of the difficulty, the distinct main tactic for tackling this version has been to
dissolve it, by showing that the Court actually follows majority opinion.
This Article emphasizes the importance of the distinction between the two
CM difficulties for understanding constitutional theory fifty years after Bickel
published The Least Dangerous Branch.8 I begin by exploring the historical
background as well as the conceptual meaning of this under-theorized split in
the definition of the CM difficulty. The second section surveys prominent
attempts to justify the Court’s CM authority. Next, I explore mechanisms
offered to dissolve the CM difficulty in its literal sense. I then examine what is
left of the CM difficulty in view of these dissolution efforts.
After establishing the distinction between the two CM difficulties and
exploring the paths taken to confront them, I turn to examine the explanatory
power of this distinction in four additional constitutional issues. Using this
distinction permits a better understanding of the connection between Bickel’s
discussion of the CM difficulty in the first part of The Least Dangerous Branch
and the “passive virtues” device that he offered in the second part of the book.9
At the time he wrote the book, before the rise of the “public-opinion culture,”
Bickel could not fully comprehend the CM difficulty in its literal sense.
However, he did devise a technique to counter the dangers that stem from it.
Next, I explain why visibility of cases in the media is important for the efforts
to dissolve the CM difficulty in its literal sense, but not for the attempts to
justify the Court’s CM authority. Based on the distinction between the two
difficulties, I explain two distinct understandings of the basis of the Court’s
power. One understanding anchors the Court’s power in its expertise, the other
in public support. While both ways to understand the Court’s power may have
existed in parallel throughout the Court’s history, the rise of public opinion
polls has sharpened the distinction between these two understandings. Finally,
I demonstrate that the CM difficulty in its literal sense is at the center of an
important puzzle in the field of comparative constitutional law. Thus, though
the CM difficulty has been considered for many years as an exceptional
American obsession, its split into two difficulties exposes that this truism is
inaccurate.

7. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 75–76.
8. BICKEL, supra note 1.
9. See id. at 111–98.
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I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE TWO CM DIFFICULTIES
A.

Historical Background

The CM difficulty captures two fundamental components of democratic
government: majoritarianism and electoral accountability.10 Judicial review of
legislation may entail not only an unaccountable institution scrutinizing the
work of an accountable one, but also a non-majoritarian institution countering
majority opinion. However, the separateness of these two components became
vivid only as polls measuring public support for the Court’s decisions
proliferated in the 1960s, and with the rise of public polling in the public mind
to the status of an on-going referendum.11
Before the invention of scientific opinion polls and the rise of the publicopinion culture, majoritarianism and electoral accountability were conflated in
discussions of the CM difficulty. Though the concept of public opinion in its
modern sense as the collective voice of the popular will appeared already in the
eighteenth century,12 there was no viable tool for measuring it (except on
election-day) before the invention of scientific public opinion polls in the
1930s.13 Thus, many thought, “Congress was public opinion.”14 Hence,
countering the will of Congress meant contravening the will of the public
majority.
Moreover, even after the invention of scientific public polling, it took time
until public support for the Court and its decisions was measured. Polling had
been institutionalized by the White House in the 1930s, yet it has become a

10. See, e.g., Kevin L. Yingling, Note, Justifying the Judiciary: A Majoritarian Response to
the Countermajoritarian Problem, 15 J.L. & POL. 81, 106 (1999) (“Just as majoritarianism is
fundamental to democracy, electoral accountability is also an indispensable feature.”).
11. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 75 (“Nowadays, Americans simply take it for
granted that the polls serve as kind of privatized voting system, providing a rolling referendum on
the president’s democratic standing.”); GEORGE F. BISHOP, THE ILLUSION OF PUBLIC OPINION:
FACT AND ARTIFACT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS 66–67 (2005) (discussing the dangers
in the growing tendency to present opinion polls as a referendum on public opinion).
12. John Durham Peters, Historical Tensions in the Concept of Public Opinion, in PUBLIC
OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT 3, 9, 11–14 (Theodore L. Glasser & Charles T.
Salmon eds., 1995) [hereinafter Peters (1995)] (“Public opinion is, first of all, an 18th-century
invention, not an eternal given of human life.”); John Durham Peters, Realism in Social
Representation and the Fate of the Public, in PUBLIC OPINION & DEMOCRACY VOX POPULI-VOX
DEI? 85, 86 (Slavko Splichal ed., 2001) (“The idea of a public realm of citizens or a sociological
aggregate—’the public’—did not exist until the eighteenth century.”).
13. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 75 (before the introduction of public opinion polls
there was “no way to prove” public support between elections); Peters (1995), supra note 12, at
14 (“By the 1920s and 1930s, public opinion was reconceived as a measurable quantity that could
be tapped by survey research.”).
14. Amy Fried & Douglas B. Harris, Governing with the Polls, 72 HISTORIAN 321, 341
(2010).
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central preoccupation of presidents only since the 1970s.15 Amongst
Congressional members, polling had become a common practice by the mid1960s.16 Gallup began conducting polls to measure public confidence in the
Supreme Court as early as the late 1930s, but it was not until the 1960s that the
Gallup and Harris organizations began to track public support for the Court
and its decisions in any systematic way.17
Hence, at the beginning of the 1960s, the period in which The Least
Dangerous Branch was written, public opinion polls had yet to attain their
current status in the public discourse as reliable reflections of popular
sentiment.18 Thus, Bickel could write with confidence that “[m]ost assuredly,
no democracy operates by taking continuous nose counts on the broad range of
daily governmental activities.”19 Since only following the rise of the publicopinion culture, a literal understanding of the CM difficulty could arise, there
is no wonder that Bickel conflated the two CM difficulties.20 He coined the
phrase “counter-majoritarian,” which is suitable for the literal sense, while
probably trying to describe the traditional sense of the problem.21 The more

15. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 24–25 (“White House interest in polling began with
Roosevelt, but it only became a central preoccupation under Richard Nixon.”); ROBERT M.
EISINGER, THE EVOLUTION OF PRESIDENTIAL POLLING 1–5 (2003); Fried & Harris, supra note
14, at 332–39.
16. See Fried & Harris, supra note 14, at 339–45; EISINGER, supra note 15, at 6–7.
17. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT 1–2, 29, 77
(2008) (“Until the 1930s there was no direct test by which to tell whether or not Supreme Court
decisions agreed with American public opinion.”); Roger Handberg, Public Opinion and the
United States Supreme Court 1935-1981, 59 INT’L. SOC. SCI. REV. 3, 5 (1984); Gregory A.
Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the U.S. Supreme
Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1210–12 (1986).
18. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 74.
19. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 17. However, Bickel was not oblivious to the potential effects
of the polling technology on the role of the Court. See id. at 239 (“Surely the political institutions
are more fitted than the Court to find and express an existing consensus—so long, at least, as the
science of opinion sampling is no further developed than it is.”).
20. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1531
(1990) (“Bickel too cavalierly glides over the distinctions between representative government and
majoritarianism when it comes to labeling the ‘difficulty’ with judicial review.”); Terri Peretti, An
Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch, in THE JUDICIARY AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 123, 125–26 (Kenneth D. Ward and Cecilia R.
Castillo eds., 2005) (examining Bickel’s different uses of the term “majority will”).
21. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 16–19; see also Eule, supra note 20, at 1531 (describing the
two available interpretations to the CM difficulty and noting that “[Bickel] described judicial
review as thwarting ‘the will of representatives’”); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional
Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1298 (2004) (“[Bickel] claimed that the requirements of
democracy are satisfied so long as ‘a representative majority has the power to accomplish a
reversal’ of policy.” (quoting BICKEL, supra note 1, at 17)). Contra David S. Law, A Theory of
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proper name for the traditional difficulty should have been the “counterrepresentative” difficulty.22
Robert Dahl’s famous 1957 article on the responsiveness of the Court to
the “dominant national alliance” used the position of the legislative majority in
Congress four years or fewer before the Court’s decision as a surrogate for
majority will since “scientific opinion polls are of relatively recent origin.”23
Thus, Dahl argued that “[f]or the greater part of the Court’s history, . . . there is
simply no way of establishing with any high degree of confidence whether a
given alternative was or was not supported by a majority or a minority of
adults or even of voters.”24
Only after decades of constant polling reshaped our notion of democratic
legitimacy did the difficulty capturing the clash between constitutionalism and
democracy change to reflect the new reality in which opinion polls serve as an
authoritative democratic legitimator.25 With the rise of public-opinion culture,
the term “public opinion” came to be synonymous with poll results.26
Congress was no longer considered as the voice of the popular will, rather,
opinion polls were. This development opened the path for the rise of the literal
version of the CM difficulty.
B.

Conceptual Analysis

Today, one can speak of two CM difficulties.27 In its traditional sense, the
CM difficulty deals with “the question of whether the democratic principle of
majority rule can be reconciled with the practice of remotely accountable

Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 728 n.15 (2009) (noting that according to
Bickel’s account, “there is nothing countermajoritarian about judicial review unless one equates
the acts of elected officials with the wishes of a majority”).
22. Eule, supra note 20, at 1531–32 (noting that “[Bickel’s] error is less in his theory than in
his terminology” and suggesting the terms “counter-representative” or “counter-republican” as
better labels for the difficulty).
23. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L 279, 283 (1957). But cf. Pildes, supra note 3, at 117 (claiming that
Dahl preferred legislative outcomes since another concept would be difficult if not impossible to
pin down).
24. Dahl, supra note 23, at 284.
25. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 75–76; SARAH E. IGO, THE AVERAGED AMERICAN:
SURVEYS, CITIZENS, AND THE MAKING OF A MASS PUBLIC 12–13, 18–19 (2007) (showing that
polls’ results serve as social facts with considerable authority); Peters (1995), supra note 12, at 14
(“Since [the 1930s] the polling of ‘public opinion’ has been installed as both a symbol of
democratic life and a cog in the machinery of the market and the state.”).
26. See BISHOP, supra note 11, at 6; HERBST, supra note 5, at 63 (“[S]cholars writing from
the 1940s to the present have been forced to contend with the notion that polls are becoming
synonymous with public opinion.”); Fried & Harris, supra note 14, at 323–24, 353.
27. Cf. Law, supra note 21, at 728 (elaborating the “two senses in which judicial review
might be described as countermajoritarian”).
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judges invalidating legislation enacted by electorally accountable
representatives.”28 The emphasis is on the difficulty of Justices striking down
statutes passed by electorally-accountable branches of the government, and not
on the majority support for these statutes.29
Accountability allows the public to replace its representatives through
periodical elections and for whatever reason. Elected branches are responsible
to the electorate.30 Justices, on the other hand, are not directly and regularly
accountable to the electorate or to its representatives. While they must survive
a majoritarian process of nomination and confirmation administrated by
elected representatives,31 there is no effective mechanism for holding them
accountable to the public and its representatives once on the bench.32 Justices
cannot be replaced directly by the electorate, nor can the elected
representatives dismiss them at will. Indeed, they rarely bear the costs of their
mistakes.33
The literal version of the CM difficulty emphasizes the majoritarian aspect
of democracy, i.e. the Court’s responsiveness to public opinion. Elected
branches are responsive to the majority’s will as expressed in elections and in
28. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO.
L.J. 491, 492 (1997).
29. See ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISM AND THE
ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 7–9 (2000) (discussing the CM
difficulty); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4–5
(1980) (“[T]he central function, and it is at the same time the central problem, of judicial review
[is that] a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is
telling the people’s elected representatives that they cannot govern as they’d like.”); Aharon
Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV.
16, 48 (2002) (“Critics of my theory argue that the non-accountability of judges should deprive
them of the power to void statutes. Such power must only be given to the representatives of the
people, who are accountable to them. This is the countermajoritarian argument made again and
again.”).
30. See Dennis Murashko, Accountability and Constitutional Federalism: Reconsidering
Federal Conditional Spending Programs in Light of Democratic Political Theory, Comment, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 931, 939 (2007) (discussing different meanings of the term “accountable” and
stating that “[f]or their actions, public officials are responsible to the electorate”).
31. Thus, they can be considered to be indirectly accountable to the public. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 9–10 (1982)
(distinguishing between direct and indirect accountability); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the
Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1391 (2006) (“The President is elected and
people often know what sort of persons he is likely to appoint to the Supreme Court, and the U.S.
Senators who have to approve the appointments are elected also, and their views on this sort of
thing may be known as well. True, the Justices are not regularly held accountable in the way
legislators are, but, as we have already remarked, we are not looking for perfection.”).
32. LIPKIN, supra note 29, at 246 n.31.
33. Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571,
1575 (1988).
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other manifestations such as opinion polls. They adopt policies that are
signaled as preferred by citizens.34 Justices, on the other hand, have lifetime
tenure, which relieves them from the need to be responsive to the majority (of
the public or its representatives), as well as an ethos of unresponsiveness to
popular pressure.35
Some commentators, even today, conflate the Court’s countering elected
and accountable institutions with the Court’s countering public opinion.36
Others, like Nathaniel Persily, understand and adopt the literal version
wholeheartedly: “After all, if the Court merely reflected public opinion in its
decisions, then whatever other problems it might have, it could not be
described as countermajoritarian.”37 According to the traditional version of the
CM difficulty, this statement is false. The fact that the Court’s decision aligns
with the majority’s views does not negate, at least as a formal matter, the

34. See, e.g., Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski & Susan C. Stokes, Introduction to
DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 1, 9 (Adam Przeworski, Susan C.
Stokes & Bernand Manin eds., 1999) (“These signals may include public opinion polls . . . .”);
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 33–38 (1980) (“[T]he empirical
surveys divulge that congressmen feel that their voting records will contribute significantly to
their election and thus they are strongly influenced by their perception of their constituents’
preferences.”).
35. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908) (“Constitutional questions . . . are
not settled by even a consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written
constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action . . . .”); James G.
Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1037,
1120 (“[M]any Justices have separated the judicial domain, excluding public opinion, from the
political domain, where public opinion reigns supreme.”); Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based
Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 44 (1993) (“[T]he courts are
not, either in their ethos or image, elective institutions, whereas parliament—whatever its
imperfections—obviously is.”).
36. See, e.g., Scott E. Lemieux & David J. Watkins, Beyond the “Countermajoritarian
Difficulty”: Lessons from Contemporary Democratic Theory, 41 POLITY 30, 32 (2009) (“It is
assumed that when courts exercise judicial review, they are contravening the will of the political
branches, and therefore by extension the will of the majority.”).
37. Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 3, 5 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008); see also
Friedman, supra note 6, at 2605 (“Ultimately, the [CM] claim (and the fear) must be that judges
strike down popular laws.”); Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1212–13 (2010) (“[T]he countermajoritarian difficulty is a normative
problem that attaches to those decisions in which courts . . . contravene the majority’s
preference. . . . [C]ourts make constitutional decisions with which most Americans disagree.”);
Peretti, supra note 20, at 125–41 (arguing that the Court is not CM since it “decides consistently
with public opinion a majority of the time”).
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problem with an electorally unaccountable institution striking down laws
enacted by an elected and accountable institution.38
The two versions of the CM difficulty are obviously connected. As
Michael Perry notes, “one important reason we value electorally accountable
policymaking is that we think it more sensitive to the sentiments of the
majorities than is policymaking that is not electorally accountable.”39 Indeed,
laws ordinarily correspond to the majority’s preferences.40 Yet, the two
difficulties are still distinct from each other. When, according to public
opinion polls, the public supports the Court’s decision to overrule a statute, the
Court’s decision is not CM in the literal sense. However, it is still CM in the
traditional sense since an unaccountable institution struck down a statute that
was passed by electorally accountable branches of government.41 The Court
acts in a CM manner in the traditional sense whenever it invalidates a statute
enacted by an elected body, and not only, as the literal definition of the CM
difficulty entails, when it invalidates statutes that enjoy popular support.42
Similarly, the Court may enjoy public support as an institution making it in
a sense a “majoritarian institution,” yet it remains a “deviant institution in the
American democracy” since it is CM in the traditional sense.43 Moreover, the
Court may enjoy durable majoritarian support as an institution even while
deciding some cases in a CM fashion in the literal sense. The public may
disagree with certain decisions making them CM in the literal sense. However,
the more durable public support for the Court as an institution can transcend
such reactions to the Court’s concrete performance and remain unscathed.44
Hence, the Court may be a majoritarian institution in the literal sense while
deciding some cases against public opinion i.e., deciding literally in a CM

38. See Friedman, supra note 6, at 2596 & n.3 (detecting a “lack of clarity” in the definition
of the CM difficulty concerning the question whether the difficulty is with “the substance of
judicial decisions (i.e., that they do not comport with outcomes the majority would prefer) or the
process of judicial decisionmaking (i.e., that judges are unaccountable in an electoral sense).”).
39. PERRY, supra note 31, at 170 n.4.
40. See Eule, supra note 20, at 1532.
41. David Kairys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1, 19
n.16 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (“[W]hen legislatures act counter to the will or inclinations
of the majority of their constituents, judicial invalidation of legislation can be both majoritarian
(in the sense that most people support it) and countermajoritarian (in the sense that a court is
negating the action of a majoritarian institution).”).
42. See PERRY, supra note 31, at 170 n.4 (“[T]he political principle to which we are
philosophically committed demands only that poicymaking be electorally accountable, not that it
necessarily generate policies supported by a majority of the electorate . . . .”).
43. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 18.
44. Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 636–38 (1992); Friedman, supra note 6, at 2614–17.
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fashion. However, overtime, sustained disappointment with the Court’s
decisions will lead to a decline in the durable support that the Court enjoys.45
The technological change that separated public opinion from the
representatives’ position brought to light the distinction between the two CM
difficulties. However, it should be stressed that the split between the two CM
difficulties is not between countering public opinion and countering the
opinions of representatives. The literal difficulty deals with Court’s decisions
countering majority public opinion.46 The traditional difficulty deals with
striking down legislation of an electorally accountable institution by an
institution that is unaccountable.
II. JUSTIFYING THE COURT’S CM AUTHORITY
For many years, scholars who confronted the CM difficulty had usually
done so by proposing normative justifications for the Court’s CM authority.
Until recently, however, the two definitions of the CM difficulty had been
conflated.
Therefore, scholars did not usually examine whether the
justification they proposed addressed one or both of these difficulties.
These justifications typically have a two-step format. First, the scholar
explicates a worthy normative goal that can be extracted from the

45. Friedman, supra note 6, at 2615 (“[I]ntense enough specific disagreement with an
institution ultimately will have an impact on diffuse support.”); CHOPER, supra note 34, at 139
(“At some point—the exact location of which is unknown, but the existence in fact virtually
undisputed—the Court’s continued antimajoritarian rulings will tip the balance of credit
accumulation and expenditures and animate a public sentiment that it has but a gossamer claim to
legitimacy in a democratic society . . . .”).
46. A further distinction between the will of the majority of the public and the will of the
current majority of the representatives can be made. Thus, the CM difficulty in its literal version
can be split into two. One version deals with the Court that counters the opinion of majority of
the public; the other deals with the Court that counters the opinion of the current majority of
representatives. Indeed, it is possible for the majority of representatives to support a law that runs
against public opinion. It is also possible for the majority of representative to oppose a law,
without repealing it, although the public supports the law. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL
PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 49–53 (2005) (showing that Congress can diverge from popular opinion
substantially and for a significant period of time). While such a distinction is not a meaningless
exercise in hair splitting, it is not the focus of my argument and thus for the purposes of clarity I
will disregard it. For discussion on this distinction see LIPKIN, supra note 29, at 11 (“Even in a
direct, participatory democracy, a ‘new’ majority must wait for elections to give its voice
effect.”); Pildes, supra note 3, at 120 (“[T]he Lochner era’s activism might have reflected
majority popular opinion even as the Court overturned lawmaking majorities.”); John Ferejohn &
Pasquale Pasquino, The Countermajoritarian Opportunity, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 353, 360–65
(2010) (“In any representative democracy it is always possible to have a double majority where
the parliamentary and popular majorities diverge, and this indeed becomes likely as the election
recedes in time.”).
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Constitution,47 such as protecting disadvantaged groups of society, preserving
democratic procedures, and guarding certain basic moral values.48 Second, the
scholar explains why the mission of achieving this goal is “peculiarly suited to
the capabilities of the courts,” and “will not likely be performed elsewhere if
the courts do not assume it.”49
All the justifications for the Court’s CM authority share two other
important features: first, according to all of the approaches, the Court’s CM
authority is acknowledged and embraced, not dissolved or condemned.50
Second, each justification for the Court’s CM authority serves as an
Archimedean point of agreement, a shared perspective. From an external point
of view, each justification may be contested. But from the point of view
internal to constitutional discourse, the adopted justification serves as the
metric according to which all arguments are measured. Indeed, within the
boundaries of a system that adopted a certain justification, the power of a legal
argument is measured by its persuasiveness in terms of that justification. A
few prominent examples of justifications for the Court’s CM authority will
demonstrate these points.
A.

Rights-Based Arguments

Rights-based arguments seek to justify the Court’s CM authority by
claiming that certain basic rights are required in order to achieve the
constitutional commitment to freedom, independence, equality, the full
humanity of every member of society, or any other concern that stands at the
basis of the Constitution.51 Such arguments hold (or at least assume) that due
to their special training or their relative insularity from public opinion (or

47. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 11 (1991) (describing
the common thread of “rights foundationalists” as “[w]hatever rights are Right, all agree that the
American constitution is concerned, first and foremost, with their protection”).
48. Roberto Gargarella, In Search of a Democratic Justice – What Courts Should Not Do:
Argentina, 1983-2002, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY
FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 181, 182 (Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella & Elin
Skaar eds., 2004) (describing several justifications for the CM authority).
49. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 24.
50. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 28, at 492 (“One familiar response turns the tables by
treating the difficulty as a virtue.”); Lemieux & Watkins, supra note 36, at 32 (“[T]he
countermajoritarian nature of the courts is a good thing, because courts are uniquely well situated
to protect the rights of individuals or disadvantaged groups against an excessively powerful
majority.”).
51. See Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the
Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 638–39 (2003) (“[T]he foundational moral commitment
of liberal democracy is to the true and full humanity of every human being—and, therefore, to the
inviolability of every human being—without regard to race, sex, religion, etc. This commitment
is axiomatic for liberal democracy.”); Waldron, supra note 35, at 20–21 (specifying various
concerns at the basis of theories of rights).
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both), judges enjoy some institutional advantages over legislators with respect
to the process of discovering, asserting, and implementing human rights.52
Subsequently, judicial review is justified as a necessary means to guarantee the
protection of these rights.53
B.

Process-Based Arguments

Process-based arguments read the Constitution as anchoring a thin
normative goal. “[P]reserving fundamental values is not an appropriate
constitutional task,”54 and thus, besides the procedure of political
majoritarianism, no other value is constitutionally entrenched.55
According to the process-based justification, first raised in Carolene
Products’ footnote four56 and further developed most famously by Ely,57 in
order to prefect democracy, the role of detecting democratic procedural
malfunctions should be entrusted in the hands of the judiciary. While courts
are inferior to legislators in making substantive judgments, judges are “experts
on process and . . . political outsiders,” “uniquely situated to ‘impose’”
process-based values.58 Hence, the intervention in majoritarian decisions by
judicial review can only be justified when it is required to correct failure in the
democratic majoritarian process.59 Judicial review to secure rights is
appropriate in instances in which these rights are constitutive of a wellfunctioning majoritarian process.60

52. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 51, at 654–57 (“[M]any articulated human rights are not
likely to be optimally protected in a democracy unless politically independent courts play a
significant role in protecting them.”).
53. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (2009) (“Majority rule by itself cannot be trusted to
protect religious, political, racial, and geographic minorities from oppression, nor to protect
fundamental human rights when they are needed by the powerless or the unpopular.”).
54. ELY, supra note 29, at 88; see also Ernest Young, The Trouble with Global
Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527, 530 (2003) (“[T]he main restrictions on governmental
power under the American Constitution are procedural rather than substantive in nature.”).
55. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 29, at 181 (“[J]udicial review . . . can appropriately concern
itself only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political
choice under attack.”).
56. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
57. ELY, supra note 29, at 75–77 (characterizing his own theory as filling in the outlines of
Carolene Products).
58. ELY, supra note 29, at 75 n.*, 75–77, 88, 102, 112.
59. See Samuel Estreicher, Platonic Guardians of Democracy: John Hart Ely’s Role for the
Supreme Court in the Constitution’s Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 552–54 (1981); see
also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1979) (“The footnote identified two instances of legislative failure: abridgment of
the right to vote and victimization of a discrete and insular minority . . . .”).
60. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 46 (2001)
(discussing process-based justifications).
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Process-based theories do not only justify the Court’s CM authority, they
also partly dissolve the CM difficulty in its literal sense. These theories
acknowledge that due to failures in the democratic process, laws do not
necessarily represent the will of the electorate. Thus, limiting the Court’s
interventions to instances in which it can perfect, rather than override, the
workings of the majoritarian political process ensures that the CM difficulty in
its literal formulation is partly dissolved.61 Indeed, process-based theories aim
only to police majoritarianism democracy, not to override it by making
substantive choices, as do justification theories that offer a substantive vision.62
Yet, process-based theories do not suggest that the Court’s interventions are
limited to cases in which a certain law counters the majority’s view. Their aim
is to protect the process of political majoritarianism, not to dissolve the CM
difficulty in its literal sense.63
C. Dworkin’s Empire
Ronald Dworkin’s argument combines the rights-based and process-based
approaches.64 According to Dworkin, the goal of democracy is to ensure that
each person receives equal concern and respect for his or her basic rights by
the institutions of government, not that the majority of the citizens necessarily
or usually get its way.65 Judicial review can thus be justified if it increases the

61. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
875, 895 (2003); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 859, 893–95 (2009).
62. ELY, supra note 29, at 103; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 34,
69 (1985) (analyzing process-based approaches as suggesting that “the Court can avoid
trespassing on democracy by policing the processes of democracy itself”); Fiss, supra note 59, at
6 (“The theory of legislative failure should be understood as a general presumption in favor of
majoritarianism . . . .”); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 148–49 (1992) (“[T]he Court’s role is limited to
remedying the process; it may not substitute its value judgments for those of elected
institutions.”).
63. ELY, supra note 29, at 103 (“Our government cannot fairly be said to be
‘malfunctioning’ simply because it sometimes generates outcomes with which we disagree,
however strongly . . . .”).
64. Compare Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 133, 143 (1997) (book review) (“It may be useful to think of Dworkin’s approach to the
practice of judicial review as belonging to the same family as John Hart Ely’s approach.”), with
Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 824 (1999) (“[M]ajoritarian
procedures are adopted to guarantee equal status for individuals, not to satisfy the goals of
majority rule.”).
65. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 16–17 (1996) (rejecting the “majoritarian premise” and arguing that “the defining
aim of democracy [is] . . . that collective decisions be made by political institutions whose
structure, composition, and practices treat all members of the community, as individuals, with
equal concern and respect”); id. at 72–78, 212–16; DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 32 (noting that

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

THE TWO COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTIES

347

likelihood of fulfilling this goal. As with rights-based approaches, the goal is
to protect rights, not majoritarian procedures.66 But due to his broad definition
of democracy, Dworkin views a failure to respect the moral equality of all
citizens as a democratic malfunction that justifies a review of legislation.67
Thus, by adopting a broader definition of democracy, Dowrkin is able to argue,
in the spirit of the process-based approach, that judicial review strengthens
rather than undermines democracy.68
While Dworkin denies that judges enjoy some inherent advantages over
other officials with respect to the process of discovering constitutional values
or protecting fundamental rights,69 he contends that in the United States the
authority of judicial review “is already distributed by history,” and it is
currently settled that the Supreme Court holds the final interpretative
authority.70
D. Textualism and Originalism
Textualism and originalism aim to bind the current public to the original
constitutional course as plainly expressed in the words of the Constitution or
understood by those who wrote the Constitution/the generation living at that
period.71 All the approaches described above present themselves as emanating
from the constitutional text, but textualism and originalism are more “textbased” theories.72

democracy and the rule of law “are rooted in a more fundamental ideal, that any acceptable
government must treat people as equals”); see also Luna, supra note 64, at 824–25 (summarizing
Dworkin’s position).
66. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133 (1977) (arguing that constitutional
restraints “[can] be justified by appeal to moral rights which individuals possess against the
majority”).
67. Dorf, supra note 64, at 143 (summarizing Dworkin’s position as being that, “legislation
that denies persons equal respect is . . . inconsistent with constitutional democracy”).
68. See DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 153–55; DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 70 (“If we give up
the idea that there is a canonical form of democracy, then we must also surrender the idea that
judicial review is wrong because it inevitably compromises democracy.”).
69. See DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 7, 12, 34. There seems to have been a shift in
Dworkin’s position. In his earlier writings, one can find indications that he believed courts were
structurally the best institution for principled decision. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE
244 (1986).
70. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 2, 12, 33–35, 74.
71. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 444–46 (2007) (describing the development of different versions of originalism:
original intention, original understanding, and original meaning).
72. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV.
535, 541–45 (1999) (distinguishing between text-based theories and practice-based theories, and
positioning “originalism” in the former camp).
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The CM difficulty captures the clash between the voice of “We the
People” who produced the constitutional text and the voice of the current
people and their representatives. According to originalists and textualists,
review of legislation is justified since in terms of democratic legitimacy, the
original voice of the popular sovereign as fixed in the Constitution is superior
to the current passing whims of public opinion.73 Judicial review is the best
mechanism for ensuring loyalty to the people’s original voice, since the
Justices possess expertise in the field of constitutional history or in textualist
analysis.74
E.

Ackerman’s Dualist Model

According to Bruce Ackerman’s dualist model, in times of normal politics,
the Court’s CM role is justified because the CM judicial review power binds
the People to their own constitutional principles that were ratified in times of
“higher lawmaking.”75
In these relatively short periods of time of
“constitutional politics,” constitutional changes are not necessarily made
according to the formal procedure for amending the Constitution that is
anchored in Article V. Ackerman argues that the constitutional constraints of
Article V compel the People to recruit sustained and enduring political energy
to either amend the Constitution according to Article V or make a
constitutional change transgressing its constraints.76 Only a significant
mobilization of the People can muster enough force to change the
achievements of pervious higher lawmaking power.77 Public support of such a
change has to be qualitatively different from the support of normal legislation,

73. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT &
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 2, 7, 9, 42–44 (2011)
(explaining the fixation thesis and the argument for originalism’s democratic legitimacy);
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 276 (2009)
(“Originalism is uniquely consistent with democratic government, they argue, because it ensures
that judges will invalidate democratically enacted laws only when those laws conflict with the
judgment of the supermajority that ratified the constitution.”).
74. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 8–9, 18 (1977).
75. ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 9–10.
76. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 4–5 (1998) (“The
higher lawmaking system imposes specially rigorous tests upon political movements that hope to
earn the heightened sense of democratic legitimacy awarded to spokesmen for We the People.”);
ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 7, 10 (“Only after negotiating this more arduous obstacle course
can a political elite earn the authority to say that We the People have changed our mind.”); id. at
19 (recognizing “a deepening dialogue between leaders and masses within a democratic structure
that finally succeeds in generating broad popular consent for a sharp break with the status quo”);
id. at 27.
77. ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 10, 13, 48, 165, 184–85, 264–65; ACKERMAN, supra note
76, at 6, 29.
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both in the degree of majority support and in the duration and depth of
deliberation.78 After the period of “constitutional politics,” in times of “normal
politics,” the Court’s role is to “translate the rare successes of constitutional
politics into cogent doctrinal principles capable of controlling normal
politics.”79
Simple passing desires do not express the considered judgments of the
people in their collective capacity. These are mere public opinion, even when
enacted into law. As such, these desires should be constrained by the judicial
review mechanism, which binds the people to their considered constitutional
judgments.80 The political branches similarly cannot be allowed to stray from
the constraints placed upon them by the people.81 Indeed, the Justices’ role “is
to preserve the higher law solutions reached by the People against their erosion
during periods of normal politics.”82 In such times, the Court “represents” the
people, who are absent.83
Ackerman thus justifies the Court’s CM authority based on its ability to
preserve the people’s higher-law achievements, even those that were not
formally codified. But Ackerman’s model does more. It also presents a
mechanism for the dissolution, at least in some cases, of the CM difficulty in
its literal sense. In certain constitutional moments, “We the People” are able to
break through the formal procedures of legality, and accord enduring public
opinion a de-facto status of a constitutional amendment. In other words, if the
transformation in public opinion is enduring and strong enough, it can overturn
judicial constitutional decisions which counter public opinion.
According to Ackerman, the preservationist function is very suited for the
Court, since it relies on judicial expertise in identifying extraordinary moments

78. Bruce Ackerman, The Political Case for Constitutional Courts, in LIBERALISM
WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N.
SHKLAR 205, 209–10 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996) (discussing depth, breadth, and decisiveness
required to endow an initiative with special constitutional status).
79. ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 290; see also id. at 60 (“[The Court’s] job is to preserve
the higher law solutions reached by the People against their erosion during periods of normal
politics.”); id. at 72, 263–65; David M. Golove, Democratic Constitutionalism: The BickelAckerman Dialectic, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra
note 20, at 71, 80–81.
80. See ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 242–43, 262–63.
81. Id. at 171 (“During periods of normal politics, [government officials] must be
constrained by the constitutional forms imposed during rare periods of constitutional creativity,
when the People mobilize and speak with a very different voice.”); id. at 261–64, 289.
82. Id. at 60; see also id. at 9–10, 72, 192, 263.
83. Id. at 264–65 (“[T]he Supreme Court is . . . an ongoing representative of a mobilized
People during the lengthy periods of apathy, ignorance, and selfishness that mark the collective
life of the private citizenry of a liberal republic.”).
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of public mobilization (“constitutional politics”).84 “Quite simply,” he
explains, “the Justices are the only ones around with the training and the
inclination to look back to past moments of popular sovereignty, and to check
the pretensions of our elected politicians when they endanger the great
achievements of the past.”85
III. DISSOLVING THE CM DIFFICULTY IN ITS LITERAL SENSE
A.

Robert Dahl Plants the Seeds for Dissolving the Literal CM Difficulty

In 1957, Robert Dahl published a revolutionary article.86 Dahl’s aim was
to examine the empirical basis of what is arguably the most common
justification for the Court’s CM authority: the claim that the Court “stands in
some special way as a protection of minorities against tyranny by majorities.”87
Based on empirical data, Dahl argued that Supreme Court decisions rarely
obstruct important policies of national majorities.88 Dahl suggested that the
Court acts in a CM fashion only during “short-lived transitional periods,” when
the dominant political coalition is disintegrating or otherwise unstable.89 Most
of the time, the appointment of Justices by Presidents who are part of dominant
political coalition ensures that the Court’s decisions are in line with the will of
lawmaking coalitions.90

84. See id. at 263–65; Golove, supra note 79, at 80–81.
85. Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1806–07 (2007); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 139 (“What the
judges are especially equipped to do is preserve the achievements of popular sovereignty during
the long periods of our public existence when the citizenry is not mobilized for great
constitutional achievements.”).
86. Dahl, supra note 23. While the idea that the Court, “with but few exceptions, adjusted
itself in the long run to the dominant currents of public sentiment,” had already been suggested by
DEAN ALFANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL 40 (1937), or even by 1 JAMES
BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 242–43 (1995) (1888), Dahl provided it with a firmer
empirical basis. See Pildes, supra note 3, at 114–15 (discussing the relation of Dahl’s work to
that of Alfange); Adrian Vermeule, “Government by Public Opinion”: Bryce’s Theory of the
Constitution 17 (Harvard Working Paper No. 11–13, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=1809794 (“[I]t is Bryce, not Robert Dahl, who first clearly articulates the thesis that
judges in some sense follow either current public opinion or the views of past political coalitions .
. . .” (footnote omitted)). For the revolutionary nature of Dahl’s article, see David Adamany &
Stephen Meinhold, Robert Dahl: Democracy, Judicial Review, and the Study of Law and Courts,
in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 361 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).
87. Dahl, supra note 23, at 282; see also Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, The Easy Core Case
for Judicial Review, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 227, 232 (2010) (noting that the rights-based
justification is “perhaps the most popular and well entrenched in American legal thought”).
88. Id. at 283–84.
89. Id. at 293.
90. Adamany & Meinhold, supra note 86, at 362–63, 374 (discussing Dahl’s argument);
Pildes, supra note 3, at 104–05 (“Dahl . . . concluded that the Supreme Court had not functioned
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Following Dahl, other social scientists have shown a correlation between
the Court’s constitutional decisions and the policy preferences of legislative
majorities at the national level.91 Since the mid-1980s, social scientists have
published studies that present a correlation between public opinion, as
measured by polls, and the Court’s decisions on most publicly salient-issues.92
In his comprehensive studies of the relationship between the Court’s decisions
and public opinion, Thomas Marshall concluded that “[o]verall, the evidence
suggests that the modern Court has been an essentially majoritarian
institution.”93
Until recently, however, constitutional theorists have largely focused on
offering normative justifications for the Court’s CM authority.94 This has
changed significantly during the last decade or so, as more and more legal
theorists have come to realize the importance of social-science research to
constitutional discourse.95 Thus, empirical findings have convinced many of
them that over time, the Court’s decisions tend to reflect the majority’s opinion
rather than thwart it.96

historically as a countermajoritarian institution and, for structural reasons, was unlikely to do
so.”).
91. See, e.g., Michael McCann, How the Supreme Court Matters in American Politics: New
Institutionalist Perspectives, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS 63, 69 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999)
(presenting the conventional wisdom among social scientists following Dahl’s article and its
refinement as a result of further studies).
92. See, e.g., Adamany & Meinhold, supra note 86, at 372–73; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST
DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 6 (2006) (“Beginning with Robert
Dahl in the 1950s, political scientists have argued that the Supreme Court throughout its history
has tended to follow national opinion rather than challenging it.”); Peretti, supra note 20, at 132
(“Overall, the research refutes Bickel’s characterization of the Court as a countermajoritarian
institution.”); Law, supra note 21, at 730 (“[E]mpirical studies suggest that the Court’s actions are
at least as consistent with public opinion as those of the elected branches.”); David G. Barnum,
The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period,
47 J. POL. 652, 662 (1985); Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Popular Influence on Supreme
Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711, 714–15, 718, 720 (1994); PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, supra note 37.
93. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 192–93 (1989)
(“Where clear poll margins exist, three-fifths to two-thirds of Court rulings reflect the polls.”); see
also id. at 7, 78–81, 97–98, 117; MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 4–5 (stating the modern Court
appears to be as majoritarian as other American policy makers); id. at 35, 55–59.
94. See Pildes, supra note 3, at 104 (“For several decades, Bickel’s and Dahl’s warring
perspectives remained largely cabined within their own respective disciplines. Legal scholars
continued to develop normative constitutional theories . . . .”).
95. See id. at 105 (describing how Dahl’s research and Bickel’s CM difficulty came in recent
years into “more direct conversation and collision”).
96. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 92, at xii; BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 364–65 (2009) (“By the end of the Rehnquist Court, it was a widely
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Scholars have suggested several mechanisms that might explain this
correlation between the Court’s decisions and public opinion. Before
examining in detail each of these mechanisms, it is important to emphasize a
property they share. All of these mechanisms aim to dissolve the difficulty in
its literal meaning, to demonstrate that the CM difficulty is a myth or an
illusion and that the Court is in fact a majoritarian institution in the sense that
its decisions correspond to majority opinion.
B.

Dissolution Mechanisms
1. The Appointment Process

Many scholars explain the correlation between the Court’s decisions and
majority opinion by pointing to the judicial appointment process.97 This
process allows the President and the Senate majority to control the Court’s
As Dahl first demonstrated empirically, the judicial
composition.98
appointment process ensures that the Court remains attuned to the dominant
political coalition.99 Based on Dahl’s theory and subsequent empirical
corroboration, several constitutional scholars have claimed that Dahl’s
“dominant political coalition,” which controls the Court’s composition, serves
as a proxy for the majority’s views.100 In this manner, the sync between public
opinion and the Court’s decisions is ensured.101

acknowledged fact that the Court was mirroring public opinion.”); id. at 382 (“What history
shows is assuredly not that Supreme Court decisions always are in line with popular opinion, but
rather that they come into line with one another over time.”); Peretti, supra note 20, at 123, 136,
140 (“[T]he Court’s decisions match majority opinion more often than not and about as often as
the other branches.”).
97. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 3, at 139–40 (“Indeed, most majoritarians rely centrally on
this mechanism to explain how the Court purportedly comes to reflect national political
majorities.”); Peretti, supra note 20, at 132 (“Most scholars agree that the appointment process is
the dominant path through which public opinion influences Supreme Court decisions and the best
explanation for the majoritarian character of most Supreme Court decisions.”).
98. Dahl, supra note 23, at 285 (“[T]he policy views dominant on the Court are never for
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United
States.”).
99. Id. at 284–85.
100. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 55 (presenting updated empirical data supporting
Dahl’s thesis); McCann, supra note 91, at 69 (“[C]onventional accounts suggest [that] the Court
typically follows the policy agenda and preferences of legislative majorities at the national
level . . . .”). Contra e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 12, 42–44 (2007) (“Subsequent empirical analyses of Dahl’s thesis have generally
failed to confirm his findings.”); Pildes, supra note 3, at 142–43 (“Dahl’s work, pathbreaking in
1957, has not stood up over time.”).
101. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 612
(1993) (“Although federal judges are not elected, they are appointed by Presidents who stand for
popular election. Judicial appointments often mirror the popular will that elected a President.”);
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For example, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson devised the theory of
“Partisan Entrenchment.”102 “[B]y installing enough judges and Justices with
roughly similar ideological views over time,” they suggest, “Presidents can
push constitutional doctrine in directions they prefer.”103 The controlling
elected coalition determines the appointments, and thus “the Supreme Court
tends, in the long run, to cooperate with the dominant political forces of the
day.”104 In this manner, responsiveness to the opinion of the electing public is
indirectly created.105 “Justices resemble Senators who are appointed for 18year terms by their parties and never have to face election.”106 Partisan
entrenchment is “roughly but imperfectly democratic,” thus dissolving the CM
difficulty in its literal sense.107
Other scholars, however, claim that this proxy is only a crude one, and can
hardly create a prefect calibration between public opinion and the Court.108
Presidents usually do not appoint Justices who capture mainstream popular
thought, and even Justices appointed as “perfect proxy for public opinion” may
experience “ideological drift” during their term of service on the bench.109
Moreover, in view of the large number of issues adjudicated by the Court and
the length of time necessary to replace a substantial number of Justices,

FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 53, at 148 (contending that today, electoral responsiveness in
Supreme Court appointments follows de-facto from the politicization of the nomination and
confirmation processes); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism,
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1030–31 (2004) (“Because
Article III lodges the composition of the federal judiciary in the political control of the President
and the Senate, no judicial interpretation of the Constitution can withstand the mobilized,
enduring, and determined opposition of the people. Even Justice Antonin Scalia concedes that
‘the appointment and confirmation process will’ ensure the ultimate influence of popular
opinion.”).
102. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006).
103. Id. at 490; see also id. at 501 (“If the Court as a whole strays too often and too widely
from the desires of the dominant forces in national politics . . . the appointment process soon
pushes the Court back into line. The calibration is hardly perfect . . . .”); Jack M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1068
(2001) (“Partisan entrenchment through presidential appointments to the judiciary is the best
account of how the meaning of the Constitution changes over time through Article III
interpretation rather than through Article V amendment.”).
104. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 102, at 490; see also id. at 495, 501.
105. Id. at 501.
106. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 103, at 1067.
107. Id. at 1076 (“[P]artisan entrenchment . . . is in some sense the opposite of Alexander
Bickel’s famous ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’ . . . .”).
108. See, e.g., Richard Primus, Double-Consciousness in Constitutional Adjudication, 13
REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 12 (2007).
109. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 374.
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appointment of Justices is not an effective way to ensure the responsiveness of
the Court to public opinion.110
In light of this criticism, several scholars have pointed out that the
confirmation process has changed dramatically over the last forty years. In the
past, confirmation hearings were not generally on the public’s agenda, and
mass public opinion thus had almost no role in the process.111 In recent
decades, the confirmation process has become like an electoral campaign, with
public opinion serving as “the implicit gauge of selection and confirmation.”112
Hence, the Court’s responsiveness to public opinion is ensured also through
public opinion’s direct control of the appointment process.113
2. Strategic Behavior and Attitudinal Change
Rather than invoking a mediating mechanism by which majority opinion
influences the Court, several social scientists have suggested a direct link
between majority opinion and the Court’s decisions.114 Both the strategic
behavior and the attitudinal change explanations, described below, suggest that
the Justices internalize majority opinion into their own way of thinking.
The strategic explanation portrays Justices as strategic players, who
modify their behavior in light of public opinion and the behavior of other
majoritarian political players, in order to protect the Court’s enduring public

110. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 193 (1990).
111. RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION
PROCESS 10–11 (2005) (arguing that Supreme Court nominations have been highly public
processes from the late 1960s, and even more so since the 1980s); id. at 29 (“Until the last quarter
century or so, the public’s role was minimal in Supreme Court confirmations.”); BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 174–75 (2006).
112. DAVIS, supra note 111, at 16 (“[P]ublic opinion surveys and other less scientific
measures . . . become tools for proponents and opponents in justifying appointment or
rejection.”); see also id. at 6–9 (“The similarities between presidential elections and judicial
appointments are becoming increasingly apparent.”); id. at 29–31, 61–64, 75–76, 102–03; JAMES
L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY
THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 1 (2009) (“Today, one of the crucial
elements in confirmations strategies concerns how public opinion will be managed and
manipulated. . . . [A]t least since the days of the Bork defeat and Thomas victory, the preferences
of the mass public have been influential in determining who goes on the Supreme Court.”).
113. See, e.g., Law, supra note 21, at 728 (“[I]t is impossible to deny that the composition of
the Supreme Court . . . is the product of pitched struggle among political actors who pay very
close attention to the substantive views of judicial nominees.”).
114. See, e.g., William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 96–98 (1993); Micheal W. Giles, Bethany Blackstone & Richard L.
Vining, Jr., The Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages between
Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 70 J. POL. 293, 300, 303 (2008).
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support (sociological legitimacy) and policy effectiveness.115 According to
this theory, Justices worry that a decline in the Court’s enduring public support
would lead to poor implementation of the Court’s decisions, backlash, and
other negative consequences. To avoid such a decline, the Justices remain, to
some degree, responsive to public opinion.116
The attitudinal model suggests that the Justices make result-oriented
decisions, based primarily on their ideologies. The Justices’ ideologies, in
turn, are shaped by factors similar to those shaping the ideological preferences
of the public and its representatives. To the extent that the Justices share the
public’s ideological preferences, they will vindicate public opinion without
even intending to do so. Political socialization ensures that the Court’s
adjudication does not stray too far from the views of the general public and its
representatives, and a shift in public opinion is usually reflected by a parallel
shift in Justices’ ideology.117 After surveying recent studies that examine
public influence on the Court, Lee Epstein and Andrew Martin have concluded
that both the strategic behavior model and attitudinal change model are
“equally plausible.”118
3. Backlash Theories
According to Barry Friedman, as history demonstrates, the correlation
between public opinion and the Court’s decisions is driven, to a large extent,
by public backlash.119 Public backlash, as Cass Sunstein elaborates, is the
“[i]ntense and sustained public disapproval of a judicial ruling, accompanied

115. See, e.g., Giles, Blackstone & Vining, supra note 114, at 294–95; LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 11–12 (1998).
116. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum & Neil Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites,
Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1546–47 (2010) (describing the mechanism of
“legitimacy as a source of responsiveness to public opinion”); see also id. at 1563–65, 1580; Neal
Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 75 (2004)
(“Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command the military, the Court understands that it
must act in a way that garners public acceptance.”).
117. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265–67, 278–79 (1997); Giles,
Blackstone & Vining, supra note 114, at 295; Baum & Devins, supra note 116, at 1520–22
(“[T]he Justices have made clear that they are not immune from the social and political forces that
surround them.”); id. at 1557, 1560–63.
118. Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court?
Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 280–81 (2010) (arguing that
it is equally plausible that “the public has a direct influence on the Court because the Justices are
concerned about their legitimacy in the short and long-terms . . . [or that] the same things that
influence public opinion may influence the Justices, who are, after all, members of the public
too”).
119. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 362 (“One of the greatest engines of constitutional change
has been mobilization against Supreme Court decisions by those unhappy with the results.”).
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by aggressive steps to resist that ruling and to remove its legal force.”120 If a
backlash movement “muster[s] strong support, then, and only then,” Friedman
explains, “the Court tends to fall into line with the dissenting opinion.”121
Thus, social mobilization is another mechanism that ensures that the Court is
ultimately responsive to public’s views.122
The alignment between the Rehnquist Court’s decisions and public opinion
posed a challenge for both the appointment mechanism and the backlash
mechanism.123 The eleven-year period from 1994 and 2005 was the longest
the Court had gone without a change in membership since the Court’s size was
fixed at nine Justices in 1869.124 In addition, no serious public backlash
occurred in those years, and the other two branches’ “weapons to control the
justices look to have been ruled off the table or lost their force.”125 Yet, the
Court in this period was more in line with public opinion than ever before.126
In light of this conundrum, Barry Friedman has recently presented a theory
of “quiet equilibrium,” or “marriage” between the Court and public opinion.127
According to Friedman, the Court has always been attentive to public opinion,
but only recently, after more than two hundred years, have the public and the
Court understood how to interact with each other effectively.128 Today, “[t]he
justices don’t actually have to get into trouble before retribution occurs; they
can sense trouble and avoid it.”129
The “quiet equilibrium” mechanism, by which Friedman explains the
current sync between the Court and public opinion,130 is a variation on the

120. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING
DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 125 (2009).
121. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 383.
122. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 8, 96–97 (2011).
123. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 354 (“From the first Rehnquist Court right down to the
third, most, if not all, of the major decisions could be seen as keeping within the mainstream of
popular opinion.”).
124. Pildes, supra note 3, at 141 (“[T]hree of the five longest periods between vacancies since
the Court went to nine members have occurred in the last thirty years.”).
125. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 376; see also Pildes, supra note 3, at 139 (“The political
branches today are less likely effectively to resist the Court.”).
126. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 358–59, 371, 376 (“Perhaps more than ever before,
Supreme Court decisions run in the mainstream of public opinion.”).
127. Id. at 376.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also Barry Friedman, The Will of the People and the Process of Constitutional
Change, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1232, 1245 (2010) (“[I]f the system is in equilibrium, little will
be observed in the way of overt struggle.”).
130. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 376.
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backlash mechanism. It emphasizes the fear from an anticipated public
reaction rather than its actual occurrence.131
4. Public Opinion as a Legitimate Legal Argument
According to Richard Primus’s description, in certain areas of law, strong
public opinion is incorporated into legal discourse as a legitimate source of
constitutional interpretation, even without going through the formal democratic
process and even without a threat of public backlash.132 In these areas the only
relevant question is whether public opinion is “strong” enough.133 Thus, in
Primus’s picture of constitutional law, the line separating between public
opinion and the legal language disappears completely: Public opinion is
incorporated into legal language.134 A strong argument in terms of public
opinion will be considered as persuasive in terms of constitutional law.135
Similarly, David Strauss points out the Court’s attempt, “over the last
generation or so,” to “anticipate[] . . . developments in popular opinion” and to
adjudicate accordingly.136 He labels this trend “modernization.”137 “[I]nstead
of facing down popular majorities,” as would be expected from a court
adjudicating literally in a CM fashion, in certain areas the Court “yields when
it finds out that it has misgauged public opinion.”138 Strauss demonstrates that
several of the Court’s recent judgments were consciously tailored to coincide
with trends in popular opinion.139 Utilizing provisions in the Constitution
which allow a great deal of interpretative latitude, the Court is able to
invalidate a “statute if it no longer reflects popular opinion or if the trends in
popular opinion are running against it.”140 It is also able to change course,
upholding statutes “that the court previously struck down—if it becomes
apparent that popular sentiment has moved in a different direction from what
the court anticipated.”141

131. See id.
132. Primus, supra note 108, at 6, 8–9, 18–19.
133. Id. at 20 (“[I]n cases where strong public opinion bore on the question, judges would err
if they arrived at their conclusions without reference to that opinion.”).
134. Id. at 11, 19–20.
135. Id. at 8, 14.
136. Strauss, supra note 61, at 859–60 (“[O]ver the last generation or so, a very different form
of judicial review has quietly emerged—an approach that, more or less consciously, looks to the
future, not the past; that tries to bring laws up to date, rather than deferring to tradition; and that
anticipates and accommodates, rather than limits, developments in popular opinion.”).
137. Id. at 860.
138. Id. at 859–60 (“This approach, which might be called modernization, has not been fully
avowed by the Supreme Court, and it does not characterize every area of constitutional law. But
it is the dominant approach in many important areas . . . .”).
139. See, e.g., id. at 864–87.
140. Id. at 861.
141. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

358

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI:333

One important implication of “keeping the content of constitutional law
aligned with the public’s strongly held views” is the dissolution of the CM
In Strauss’s view, the rise of the
difficulty in its literal sense.142
“modernization” as “a central theme in constitutional law” serves perhaps as a
“response to the relentless criticism of judicial review as antidemocratic.”143
This mechanism ensures that “judicial review has, in principle, a more
comfortable place in democratic government.”144
C. What is Left of the CM Difficulty?
Several dissolution theorists have suggested that since the CM difficulty is
dissolved, constitutional scholars should cease to invest their time in
confronting it.145 In their view, there is no difficulty with judicial review as
long as it is responsive—over the long run—to public opinion.146 But even if
one accepts that the mechanisms described above make the Court by and large
responsive to public opinion, the second traditional CM difficulty remains undissolved. The Court may be responsive to the public and the elected
branches, but as long as it is not accountable to them, the CM difficulty in its
traditional sense is not dissolved.147 The Justices are not elected, and thus are
not responsible to the electorate in the way legislators are.
Rule by the electorate is something different from rule in accordance with
the electorate’s views. When people go and vote they intend to influence the
elections and through it the elected institutions, but in expressing their attitudes
in public polls, especially regarding the Court, they have no such intention.
Thus, even if opinion polls guarantee that the public’s views are tracked

142. Primus, supra note 108, at 10.
143. Strauss, supra note 61, at 860–61.
144. Id. at 861.
145. See Friedman, supra note 129, at 1234 (“[T]he one suggestion . . . with which I
vigorously disagree is Professor Primus’s notion that the countermajoritarian difficulty should
nonetheless be retained as a heuristic . . . . [O]n this one point I believe he is misguided.”); Pildes,
supra note 3, at 105 (arguing that some constitutional theorists “sought to dissolve Bickel’s
question or suggest that it is naive and passé”); Peretti, supra note 20, at 137 (arguing that the CM
difficulty is “a straw-man argument if there ever was one”).
146. BALKIN, supra note 122, at 71 (“What gives the system of judicial review its legitimacy,
in other words, is its responsiveness—over the long run—to society’s competing views about
what the Constitution means.”).
147. Cf. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 19 (“[O]ne may infer that judicial review, although not
responsible, may have ways of being responsive.”); PERRY, supra note 31, at 31 (“What is crucial
about majoritarian policymaking, unlike constitutional policymaking by the Supreme Court, is
that policy decisions are made by those accountable, even if not always responsive, to electoral
majorities. . . . What is crucial is electoral accountability, not degree of responsiveness to majority
sentiments.”).
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accurately, that is different from the people being in control.148 To dissolve the
difficulty in its traditional sense, which focuses on accountability rather than
on majoritarianism, one would need to demonstrate that the Court is
responsible to the electorate, and thus that the people themselves are in
control.149
The Court can be considered to be indirectly accountable to the public
through the appointment process, since it is administrated by elected
representatives.150 Other mechanisms, such as impeaching Justices or slashing
the Court’s budget, can also be understood to create indirect accountability.151
Moreover, some view responsiveness as “a measure of how much
accountability an institutional structure permits.”152 According to this view,
the scholarly effort that exposes the Court’s responsiveness to elected
representatives and to the general public shows that the Justices are subject to
their control.153 Indeed, the dissolution theorists have tried to show that
Justices, much like elected representatives, adhere to public opinion, thus
exposing mechanisms of accountability without elections.154 Similarly,
dissolution theorists conceptualize congressional opposition and presidential
pressures155 as mechanisms that ensure that the Court will be somewhat
accountable to elected representatives.156 These manifestations of discontent
by politicians may also serve as signals for the Court on its waning public
confidence, and thus can ensure indirectly accountability to the public.157 As

148. DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 76
(2008).
149. See id. at 76–77.
150. See Yingling, supra note 10, at 106–07; EISGRUBER, supra note 60, at 4 (“Though the
justices are not chosen by direct election, they are nevertheless selected through a process that is
both political and democratic. . . . The justices have . . . a democratic pedigree . . . .”).
151. See CHOPER, supra note 34, at 47–55 (discussing the political accountability of the
Supreme Court).
152. John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political
Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 34, at
131, 131.
153. See id. at 133–34.
154. See, e.g., Baum & Devins, supra note 116, at 1562–63 (“If the Justices respond
frequently to what they perceive as direct pressure from the general public, then they are
fundamentally similar to elected officials in their accountability to public opinion.”); Waldron,
supra note 35, at 43 (“Judicial review, it may be said, is a form of democratic representation,
albeit a rather indirect form.”).
155. See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political
Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 373 (1992) (noting that in times of intense congressional “hostility,”
the Court retreated).
156. Seidman, supra note 33, at 1572 (surveying different mechanisms that make the Court
accountable).
157. See TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 18–20, 257–67 (2011).
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opposed to Bickel’s formal accountability through elections, these scholars
point to accountability through politics.158
However, the traditional version of the difficulty captures an additional
important aspect of self-government. The ability to remove representatives
whose performance is deemed unsatisfactory is a crucial aspect of direct
control over representatives.159 In the absence of an agreed upon justification
for judicial review, in the absence of an agreed-upon “moral compass” for
society to follow, one way to ensure that the Court will not stray from the
“right” course is to subject those who decide to the control of the people.160
This aspect has special importance in societies where the public is less
politically active. In such societies, the public will be less engaged in daily
monitoring of its representatives and in forming opinions on political issues.
Public support levels are less relevant and more weight is given to delegation
of political power from the citizenry to its elected representatives and hence to
the ability to replace these representatives.161 This aspect of accountability
received special emphasis with regards to experts in the field of economics
after the 2008 financial collapse.162
The ability to remove representatives is a built-in feature of the system that
has both an instrumental value, in that it promotes responsiveness, and an
intrinsic value, in that it allows the public to determine its representatives at
regular intervals.163 Hence, rather than misconceiving accountability as merely
means to achieve responsiveness to the majority will, we should understand it
also as a structural feature, a check against abuses of power.164 But the
158. See Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to
Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 361, 362–63 (2008).
159. See Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Introduction to REPRESENTATION 9 (Hanna Fenichel Pitkin
ed., 1969) (describing the scholarly view that “[w]hat defines representation is not an act of
authorization that initiates it, but an act of holding-to-account that terminates it.”); HENRY J.
FORD, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 158 (1924) (arguing that “to establish a representative
system all the following conditions are essential: 1. That the people shall be free to choose whom
they will to represent them . . . 4. That elections shall be confined to the choice of
representatives.”).
160. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 284–85 (3d
ed. 1950) (“Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing
the men who are to rule them.”); see also Somin, supra note 21, at 1298; Manin, Przeworski &
Stokes, supra note 34, at 13 (“Under democracy, people invest governments with the power to
rule because they can remove them.”).
161. See MATTHEW R. CLEARY & SUSAN C. STOKES, DEMOCRACY AND THE CULTURE OF
SKEPTICISM: POLITICAL TRUST IN ARGENTINA AND MEXICO 3 (2006).
162. See, e.g., IAN SHAPIRO, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 18–19 (2011)
(discussing the pressure to subject the architects of the economic system to “new regimes of
accountability” in view of the dire results of the economic crisis).
163. See Waldron, supra note 35, at 37–38.
164. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 531, 535 (1998).
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Justices are answerable to no outside source.165 As opposed to most influential
appointed officials, Justices are hardly subject to removal by the political
branches.166 The lack of this “majority control” over Supreme Court Justices
will remain as long as the public cannot have some measure of control at
regular intervals over the identity of the judicial decision-makers.167 The
process designed to create such control is popular elections.168
Notwithstanding the imperfections of elections as a mechanism of democratic
accountability,169 in their absence, even a fully responsive Court does not
dissolve the CM difficulty in its traditional sense.170 Thus, in some sense, the
traditional CM difficulty is insoluble unless the public elects its Justices or has
another mechanism to truly hold them accountable.171
Hence, while scholars have concluded that “[c]ompared with the electoral
control over legislatures, judges may not seem so relatively unaccountable,”172
and that Congress “is the new ‘deviant institution in American democracy,’”173

165. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 438 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“There is no
power above them to controul any of their decisions. There is no authority that can remove them,
and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are independent of the
people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven.”); see also id. at 442; Shlomo
Slonim, Federalist No. 78 and Brutus’ Neglected Thesis on Judicial Supremacy, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 7, 15–17, 30–31 (2006) (explaining Brutus’ objection to judicial supremacy).
166. CHOPER, supra note 34, at 56 (presenting the “sharp contrast” between the Justices and
“highly placed and greatly influential” appointed officials in terms of accountability).
167. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 38 (2005).
168. See Friedman, supra note 101, at 588–89.
169. See, e.g., id. at 582–88, 609–10 (claiming that elections “do not appear to guarantee
accountability,” and concluding that Justices are unaccountable “only in the most formalistic and
unanalytic of senses”); Manin, Przeworski & Stokes, supra note 34, at 50 (arguing that elections
are not a sufficient mechanism to ensure citizens’ control over politicians).
170. CHOPER, supra note 34, at 58 (“That a majority of the people may ultimately prevail visà-vis the Court by outright resistance or through methods of dubious legitimacy under a rule of
law, even if a reality, is not the same as their ordained ability to change the composition of the
political branches at regularly scheduled periodic elections.”).
171. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on
Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1214, 1231 (1984)
(arguing that no theory can reconcile judicial review with democratic theory since judicial review
is CM by definition).
172. Friedman, supra note 101, at 611; see also CHOPER, supra note 34, at 16–25 (presenting
the claim that the national lawmaking process is “anything but a system that simply articulates
some readily identifiable popular will”).
173. Graber, supra note 158, at 362 (using Bickel’s famous dictum regarding the Court in
summarizing Mann & Ornstein’s work The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America
and How to Get It Back on Track).
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at the end of the day, a core right to self-government is inevitably lost when an
unelected Court exercises the authority of judicial review.174
IV. BICKEL AND THE TWO CM DIFFICULTIES
As explained above, Bickel did not distinguish between the two
difficulties. However, he was not focused solely on devising a normative
justification for the Court’s judicial review authority, as were many legal
scholars.175 Instead, Bickel was also occupied with the threat to the Court’s
public support.176 He did not attempt to show that the Court is a majoritarian
institution in the sense that it follows public opinion. But he was occupied
with the question of what will happen to the Court if it decides against public
opinion.177
According to Bickel, the Court is a unique institution in that “insofar as is
humanly possible,” it “is concerned only with principle” and not with
“electoral responsibility.”178 He portrayed the Justices as having “the leisure,
the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar,” offering a
“sober second thought” in their task to pronounce and guard “the enduring
values of a society” as opposed to the shifting and short-term public sentiments
to which the legislature is responsive.179 Thus, the Court is not a mere register
of public opinion; it serves as a leader of public opinion, a teacher in a national
seminar, where “conversations between the Court and the people and their
representatives” take place.180 This vital and otherwise unfulfilled function of
174. See Waldron, supra note 31, at 1394 (“[T]he issue is comparative, and these credentials
are not remotely competitive with the democratic credentials of elected legislators.”).
175. See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J.
1567, 1573 (1985).
176. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 68 (explaining that the Court needs to consider both principle
and expediency); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS 90–91 (1970) (stressing the need for “widespread assent” for implementing the
Court’s judgments); Christopher J. Peters & Neal Devins, Alexander Bickel and the New Judicial
Minimalism, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra
note 20, at 45, 51 (noting that Bickel recognized that “[t]he Court could not then simply impose
its judgments upon an unwilling populace; those judgments had instead to earn acceptance, if not
immediately then over time”); KAHN, supra note 62, at 143 (“Instead of seeking to take the Court
out of politics, [Bickel] hoped to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty by frankly recognizing
the majoritarian basis of the Court’s work.”).
177. See Kronman, supra note 175, at 1585–86.
178. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 25–26, 68–69; see also PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM
IN ITS PLACE 146 & n.4 (2005) (discussing the notion of the Court as the forum of reason).
179. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 27–24; see also KAHN, supra note 62, at 144 (discussing
Bickel’s theory); Friedman, supra note 101, at 579.
180. BICKEL, supra note 176, at 91; BICKEL, supra note 1, at 26 (“The Justices, in Dean
Rostow’s phrase, ‘are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar.’” (citation omitted)); id. at
239.
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offering a sober and principled second thought is Bickel’s justification for CM
judicial review.181
In addition to this attempt to justify the Court’s CM authority, Bickel also
focused on confronting dangers that stem from the CM difficulty in its literal
sense. As both Bickel and Paul Mishkin recognized, legal discourse follows
the logic of professional reason, whereas popular discourse follows the logic of
symbolism.182 For example, the logic of legal discourse requires consistency
with existing precedents. This requirement seems much less important to the
public.183 In other words, principled arguments that are persuasive in legal
terms are not necessarily persuasive in the public discourse. Since the intrinsic
merit of a legal position is hardly a guarantee of public support, the Court at
times confronts the dilemma of whether to decide salient cases against the
directives of legal doctrine in order to avoid unpopular decisions (decisions
that are CM in the literal sense).
The Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson184 exemplifies that fidelity to
legal doctrine and legal principles alone may not always secure public support.
The Court held that burning the American flag was an act of political dissent
and hence a protected expression under the First Amendment.185
Subsequently, the State of Texas could not criminalize such act.186 As Akhil
Amar writes, the Court’s decision “was plainly right, and even easy—indeed,
as right and easy a case in modern constitutional law as any I know.”187

181. See Stanley C. Brubaker, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: Tradition Versus Original
Meaning, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra
note 20, at 105, 106; Peretti, supra note 20, at 124 (arguing that Bickel’s special justification for
“this deviant institution” is “its unique capacity for reasoned elaboration of principle”).
182. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term—Foreword: The High Court, the
Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62–63 (1965) (“[T]his
symbolic view of courts is a major factor in securing respect for, and obedience to, judicial
decisions.”); Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral
Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
1473, 1484–85, 1497, 1506 (2007).
183. See James L. Gibson, Public Images and Understandings of Courts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 828, 849 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds.,
2010) (“Perhaps the most surprising finding in these data is the relatively small weight that
Americans give to respecting existing Supreme Court decisions (only 37.3% rate it as very
important).”).
184. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
185. Id. at 399, 420.
186. Id. at 418–20.
187. Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106
HARV. L. REV. 124, 125 (1992); see also Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Sacred Flag and the First
Amendment, 66 IND. L.J. 511, 547 (1991) (“Johnson is an easy case if well-established first
amendment principles are applied to it.”); Norman Dorsen, Flag Desecration in Courts,
Congress, and Country, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 417, 439 (2000) (“It may be true, as scholars
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However, from the perspective of public support, the holding that flag burning
was a constitutionally protected act had obvious potential to stir a harsh public
response.188
The decision received wide media coverage189 and “was met with virtual
hysteria—by the people, in the press, and in the Congress.”190 A large
majority of the public, 73%, disagreed with the decision.191 One commentator
argued, “no Supreme Court decision in recent memory, if ever, was so quickly,
bitterly, and overwhelmingly denounced by the American public and political
establishment.”192 Following the Johnson decision and the Webster decision
on abortion,193 there was a “dramatic drop” in public confidence in the
Court.194
In reaction to the Johnson decision, Congress passed the Flag Protection
Act.195 In June 1990, the Court in U.S. v. Eichman followed its reasoning in
Johnson and invalidated the Act as an unconstitutional restraint on free

have written, that Texas v. Johnson is an ‘easy case’ and ‘obvious.’” (footnote omitted)). Contra
Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 820–25 (1993) (criticizing
the Court’s reasoning and Amar’s claim that the case was an easy one).
188. See Peter Hanson, Flag Burning, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY, supra note 37, at 184, 185.
189. Anke Grosskopf & Jeffery J. Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme Court
Decisions Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence in the
Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 633, 638–39 (1998) (examining the wide coverage of the
decision by the major television networks and the New York Times); see also Hanson, supra note
188, at 185 (“[P]olls taken immediately after the decision show high levels of awareness to the
case and overwhelming public opposition to the Court’s decision.”); id. at 198–99 (examining
media coverage).
190. Dorsen, supra note 187, at 424 (“[W]hat may be true as a matter of constitutional
principle is often not accepted by the public.”); see also Hanson, supra note 188, at 198
(“Immediately after Texas v. Johnson, flag burning was thought to be the most important of four
major policy issues in a Gallup survey.”).
191. Grosskopf & Mondak, supra note 189, at 642–43, 651–52; see also Hanson, supra note
188, at 185–86 (“[P]olls taken immediately after the decision show high levels of awareness of
the case and overwhelming public opposition to the Court’s decision.”).
192. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, BURNING THE FLAG: THE GREAT 1989–1990 AMERICAN
FLAG DESECRATION CONTROVERSY 113 (1996).
193. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 499 (1989) (upholding constitutionality
of a statute banning the use of public facilities and public employees for the performance of
abortions not necessary to save the life of the mother).
194. Grosskopf & Mondak, supra note 189, at 641–42 (“Circumstantially, the data suggest
that Webster and Texas v. Johnson profoundly affected public confidence in the Supreme Court. .
. . Functionally, confidence in the Supreme Court reached rock bottom in July and August of
1989.”). Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), was announced on June 21, 1989, and Webster
v. Reproductive Health, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), followed on July 3.
195. The Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (2006), invalidated by United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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speech.196 Once again, polls showed that the vast majority of the American
public rejected the decision.197 The decision in Eichman vividly demonstrates
the Bickelian dilemma. The Court had to choose between adhering strictly to
the standards of professional legal reasoning, even at the price of going against
public opinion, or instead corrupting its principled, professional language in
order to resolve the case in a manner suitable for public digestion.198 Bickel
realized that in face of serious popular resistance, the Court may choose the
latter option. Saving its public support, the Court would lose its ability to
serve as the forum of principle and thus its justification for judicial review.199
Hence, he suggested that the Court use prudential justiciability doctrines to
dismiss certain cases, thus avoiding the corruption of the legal language.200
These “passive virtues” allow the Court to avoid cases in which preserving the
standards of legal expertise would harm its public support.201
Thus, Bickel was the first to structure a court-centric theory of judicial
review—i.e., one featuring “a highly strategic Supreme Court” that is
interested in preserving the quality and efficacy of its decisions as well as its
public support.202 But he did not portray the Court as an institution
controlled—in deciding substantive issues—by considerations such as
preserving its public support as an institution.203 On the contrary, the passivevirtues technique aims precisely to save the Court from such a grim destiny.
Thus, when the Court decides a volatile case on its merits, rather than use the
passive virtues, Bickel insisted that it must make a fully principled decision.204

196. 496 U.S. at 317–18.
197. Hanson, supra note 188, at 185–86.
198. See Post & Siegel, supra note 182, at 1487–88, 1496–97 (explaining that Mishkin found
this tension “unresolveable”).
199. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 258.
200. Id. at 69–71.
201. Id. at 58, 69–71 (explaining that passive virtues are “the secret” of the Court’s ability “to
maintain itself in the tension between principle and expediency”); see id. at 95–96, 205. Contra
KAHN, supra note 62, at 146 (“[Bickel] converts the Court into a political institution that cannot
claim a privileged place for law.”).
202. Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload: A Question of Law
or Politics?, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 107 (2010) (“[Bickel’s passive] virtues featured a highly
strategic Supreme Court. Knowing where it actually wanted to come out on some of the great
issues of the day, it self-consciously chose to take, or more to the point, reject certain cases
because they didn’t present the best vehicle for winning popular support because the timing just
wasn’t right.”); Peters & Devins, supra note 176, at 50, 58 (noting that the Court’s strategy was
“an approach motivated by juricentrism—by a desire to preserve the Court’s position as a coequal
institution with inherent importance in the constitutional scheme”).
203. See Peters & Devins, supra note 176, at 45–46.
204. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 69 (“When it strikes down legislative policy, the Court must act
rigorously on principle, else it undermines the justification for its power.”); id. at 199–200; see
also Mark Tushnet, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Regimes: Alexander Bickel and Cass
Sunstein, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
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The Court’s role and its raison d’être is after all, in his view, to decide cases in
a principled manner.205
However, only on rare occasions should the Court act contrary to public
opinion and endorse controversial principles, acting then as both a “shaper and
prophet of the opinion that will prevail and endure.”206 In order not to lose its
public support, the Court must pick these occasions carefully. There is a limit
to the number of principles pronounced by the Justices contrary to public
opinion that the public is willing to tolerate and that the political institutions
are willing to execute. In Gerald Gunther’s words, Bickel insisted that the
Court be one hundred percent principled twenty percent of the time.207 A
Court that does not adhere to this limit will soon discover that its decisions are
not executed and its institutional survival is endangered. In view of this
danger, the Court “labors under the obligation to succeed,” and to do so, “in a
rather immediate foreseeable future.”208
At the end of the day, with neither sword nor purse, the Court, according to
Bickel, has only public confidence that is based both on its “mystic prestige”
and on society’s “readiness to receive principle from the Court.”209 Thus,
Bickel’s story ends on a sad note. In a later work, he wrote that he had “come
to doubt in many instances the Court’s capacity to develop ‘durable
principles,’ and to doubt, therefore, that judicial supremacy can work and is
tolerable in broad areas of social policy.”210

COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra
note 20, at 23, 26; Peters & Devins, supra note 176, at 58–59, 61.
205. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 188.
206. Id. at 239.
207. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).
208. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 239. (“The Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of
it, but it must lead opinion, not merely impose its own . . . .”); see BICKEL , supra note 176, at 94–
95; Introduction, Arthur Garfield Hays Conference: The Proper Role of the United States
Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Cases, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 457, 476 (1964) (“[A] court that
decided the equivalent of five cases such as Brown v. Board of Educ. in a single year would have
seen the end of the institution, I am sure.” (footnote omitted)); Golove, supra note 79, at 83.
209. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 204, 252; see also BICKEL, supra note 176, at 94 (“The Court’s
effectiveness, it is often remarked, depends substantially on confidence, on what is called
prestige.”).
210. BICKEL, supra note 176, at 99. For a description of the change in Bickel’s view, see J.
Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 769, 780–83 (1971); Robert F. Nagel, Principle, Prudence, and Judicial Power, in THE
JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN
DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 9, 14. Contra
Kronman, supra note 175, at 1568 (“Bickel did in fact have a political philosophy that remained
unchanged throughout his career, a consistent outlook that connects all of his most important
ideas on the role of the Supreme Court . . . .”).
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V. VISIBLE CASES
The CM difficulty in its literal sense is restricted to high-salience issues.
No viable public opinion is likely to emerge on low-salience issues. Thus, the
Court cannot decide cases in a literally CM manner on issues that are obscure
to the public.211 Only in relatively few cases that deal with salient issues and
receive media coverage can the literal CM difficulty emerge.212
The media has a prominent role in determining which cases will become
CM in the literal sense. First, since, as Chief Justice Earl Warren noted, “the
public cannot be expected to read the opinions themselves [and] must depend
on newspapers, periodicals, radio, and television for its information,” a case
cannot become visible to the public without media coverage.213 Second, media
coverage does not only reflect the Court’s decisions; it reconstructs the Court’s
decisions according to the media’s criteria.214 Thus, a case can become CM in
the literal sense if it is covered in a manner that creates a stir in public opinion
even if from an internal legal perspective the case is not controversial (an “easy
case”). Similarly, public support for the Court as an institution is also
dependent to a large extent on the manner in which the media covers the
Court.215 The Court’s “symbolic image” as it is constructed by the media
rather than only the content of its decisions may prove crucial for the
emergence of the CM difficulty in the literal sense.216
For most of the theorists who offer justifications for the Court’s CM
authority (hereinafter “justification theorists”), the question of whether a case

211. See MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 124 (arguing that media exposure sets limits on how
much the Court’s decision can influence public opinion).
212. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 6, at 2620–23 (“Only a small number of the cases attract
the sort of media attention that cause them to stick in the public consciousness.”); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“Instead of
acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who
attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media.”).
213. RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 16
(1994) (quoting statements made by Chief Justice Warren).
214. See PAUL THALER, THE WATCHFUL EYE: AMERICAN JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE
TELEVISION TRIAL xxii–xxiii, 3–4, 6, 71 (1994).
215. See Kelli L. Sager & Karan N. Frederiksen, Televising the Judicial Branch: In
Furtherance of the Public’s First Amendment Rights, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1540 (1996)
(quoting Justice Frankfurter who claimed that “the public confidence in the judiciary hinges on
the public’s perception of it, and that perception necessarily hinges on the media’s portrayal of
the legal system”).
216. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 34, at 139 (“The fortress of judicial review stands or falls
with public opinion and the Court’s symbolic image is not forever indestructible.”); James L.
Gibson, Judicial Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 514,
526–27 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006) (suggesting that exposure to courts is typically
associated with exposure to legitimizing symbols of courts thereby contributing to their
legitimacy).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

368

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI:333

is visible to the public or not is immaterial.217 First, the question of public
support is not at the center of their theories. Their theories are mostly focused
on the normative justifications of the Court’s decisions and these justifications,
according to most of these theories, are unrelated to public opinion. Second,
justification theorists either view the question of public support as irrelevant or
assume that public support will be achieved as a direct byproduct of the
Court’s adherence to their normative theory. Exhibiting its expertise in the
realm of rights or constitutional history will award the Court with public
support, or so it is assumed.
Fredrick Schauer’s claim that the scholarly tendency to focus on visible
cases “distorted the debates about judicial review and judicial supremacy,”218
is perhaps correct as long as the discussion is restricted to the CM difficulty in
the traditional sense. Yet, for the discussion of the CM difficulty in its literal
sense, only these exceptional cases are relevant. These cases are “hard cases”
for the Court according to the CM difficulty in its literal sense. Non-salient
cases are “easy cases” according to this logic since the Court can “go its own
way” in deciding these cases, adhering strictly to its chosen justification
theory.219
VI. JUDGMENT VS. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
In the Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton famously proclaimed that
“[t]he judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the
purse . . . . It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even
for the efficacy of its judgments.”220 According to Hamilton, the government’s
support, essential for the efficacy of the Court’s rulings, is acquired because
the executive branch acknowledges the value of the Court’s judgment.221
Thus, Hamilton based the Court’s power “merely” on its judicial expertise.

217. However, some justification theorists did devise mechanisms to confront issues of public
support, and thus were not oblivious to questions of visibility. For example, as elaborated above,
Bickel devised his “passive virtues” to prevent the ill effect of certain kind of visible cases. See
supra Part IV.
218. Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The Court’s Agenda and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–12 (2006).
219. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 377 (“The Court also has a better chance of going its
own way in cases that are of low public salience.”); WHITTINGTON, supra note 100, at 121–22
(“Elected officials may tolerate and even favor judicial authority when the courts operate in issue
areas of relatively low political salience.”). Contra Giles, Blackstone & Vining, supra note 114,
at 302, 304 (detailing empirical data showing that public opinion effects the justices more in nonsalient cases than in salient cases).
220. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
221. Id.
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Almost two hundred years later, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote in his
dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, “[t]he Court’s authority—possessed of
neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public
confidence in its moral sanction.”222 Other Justices have repeated this idea in
various formulations.223 Though at first glance Justice Frankfurter’s argument
seems like a paraphrase of Hamilton’s dictum in the Federalist No. 78, it is
different in an important way. Justice Frankfurter wrote that the Court’s power
relies on “public confidence” in the Court’s “moral sanction”224 rather than
“merely” on its “judgment.”225 The Court’s power lies then not “merely” in its
expertise but in its ability to recruit public support.
In fact, Justice Frankfurter’s argument is more reminiscent of an argument
made two years before the Baker decision by Charles Black. In his book The
People and The Court, Black explained that judicial review would have been
impossible “if public opinion had rejected it . . . because such an institution,
founded in the end only on moral authority, could never have had the strength
to prevail in the face of resolute public repudiation of its legitimacy.”226
Hamilton’s view represents well the negative view of popular opinion held
by many of the founders.227 Based on this view, Justices were given life tenure
222. 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter emphasized
the need of public support as basis for the Court’s legitimacy while dissenting from a decision
which was the point of origin of the “one person, one vote” thesis. Id. This decision was part of
a wider trend of promoting democracy and popular will as the foundational governing ideal of
American Constitutional law. Justice Frankfurter opposed the Court’s involvement in
reapportionment because of his fear that it would undermine the Court’s legitimacy. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore?, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 4 (2002).
223. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992)
(“The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that
shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary . . . .”); Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 817–18 (2002) (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (“Because courts control neither
the purse nor the sword, their authority ultimately rests on public faith in those who don the
robe.”).
224. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 220, at 523.
226. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
DEMOCRACY 209 (1960).
227. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 1–2 (“Hamilton’s views also reflected a thenwidely-held ‘classical’ view of public opinion. During the 1600s and 1700s most political writers
viewed mass public opinion as based largely upon emotion, not reason; as unstable and easily
changeable; as coercive of individuality; and, very frequently, as contrary to higher, principled
views of law and rights. From this classical perspective, direct expressions of mass public
opinion presented a serious threat to political and economic rights.”); DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 86 (2002) (“[M]any (if not most) of the drafters and ratifiers of
the Constitution profoundly mistrusted the people, and structured the Constitution to put as little
power as possible in the hands of the masses.”); Friedman, supra note 101, at 617–20 (“Thus,
time and again during the period of drafting and ratification of the Constitution, the Framers
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and salary protection to ensure their ability to resist shifts in the popular
opinion and to reject majoritarian policies that run counter to the
Constitution.228 The Court was viewed as one among several CM mechanisms
that exist in the Constitution.229 In this spirit, Hamilton described judicial
independence as “an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill
humours in the society.”230
Indeed, many of the Framers envisioned the Constitution as a constraint on
majoritarian desires, binding the people to the right track.231 The judiciary’s
role is to serve as a “safeguard” that ensures the Constitution’s binding effect.
The judiciary is able to fulfill this role because it holds legal expertise required
for interpreting a legal document such as the Constitution.232 In view of the
“laborious study” required to “acquire a competent knowledge” of the law,
Hamilton explained that only “few men . . . will have sufficient skill in the
laws to qualify them for the stations of judges.”233
The various justifications for the Court’s CM authority that were presented
above are in line with Hamilton’s dictum.234 According to each of these
justifications, the Justices hold a certain unique knowledge, training, or
position that allows them to produce the correct constitutional judgment. Yet
while according to Hamilton, the Court’s expertise is restricted to the domain
of legal doctrine, justification theorists understand that in view of the
indeterminate nature of many constitutional norms, legal expertise cannot
serve as the sole source for judgment.235 Thus, whether judicial expertise is in

condemned the evil of faction and expressed fear of the tyranny of the majority.”); 2 JAMES
BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 926 (1995) (1888) (arguing the Founders “conceived
of popular opinion as aggressive, revolutionary, unreasoning, passionate, futile, and a breeder of
mob violence”); Eule, supra note 20, at 1522–23 (describing the Framers’ distrust of majorities).
228. MARSHALL, supra note 93, at 1; FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 227, at 103–04
(according to the founders’ beliefs, “one function of the Supreme Court is to preserve that
venerable document [the Constitution] from the onslaughts of a temporarily impassioned
majority”); ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 33 (“The Founders disagreed—building on their colonial
experience, they took strong measures to protect the judges from political pressures.”).
229. See Friedman, supra note 101, at 620.
230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 220, at 528.
231. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 421 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) (documenting Madison’s view that the role of constitutional constraints is “to protect [the
people] agst. the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led”).
232. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 33 (“The only expertise the Founders recognized was of the
legal variety . . . .”); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 16–17, 21 (2009)
(criticizing Hamilton’s “idea that the courts embody ‘judgment,’ while the legislative and
executive branches embody ‘will’”).
233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 220, at 529.
234. See supra Part II.
235. See, e.g., L.H. LaRue, Neither Force Nor Will, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 181 (1995)
(“I do not recall anyone arguing [in recent controversies over judicial appointments] that a deep,
scholarly knowledge of the precedents was the fundamental prerequisite for the job. Why not?
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the realm of enunciating values and articulating principles for the long term as
Bickel suggests,236 or in the realm of constitutional history as Ackerman and
the originalists proclaim,237 according to all these justification theorists,
Justices hold expert abilities that are not restricted merely to the realm of legal
doctrine.
But Hamilton’s position was not only a result of his distrust of the
multitude, he also had serious doubts as to whether Justices would be able to
muster public support. Arguing against assigning Supreme Court Justices a
role in the impeachment process, Hamilton wrote that “it is still more to be
doubted, whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority, which
might, on certain occasions, be indispensable, towards reconciling the people
to a decision, that should happen to clash with an accusation brought by their
immediate representatives.”238
At least in the early days of the Republic, one can find indications that
Hamilton’s prediction was correct.239 For example, after Chief Justice Oliver
Ellsworth fell ill, President John Adams turned to John Jay, asking him to
return to the position. Jay refused the appointment, explaining that the Court
labored under a judicial system so defective that it could never “obtain the
energy, weight, and dignity which are essential to its affording due support to
the national government, nor acquire the public confidence and respect which,
as the last resort of the justice of the nation, it should possess.”240 In the
aftermath of the McCulloch decision, Ellsworth’s successor, Chief Justice
Marshall, also acknowledged the truth of Hamilton’s observations. In response

Because none of us believes that our judges are ‘bound down by strict rules and precedents which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.’ None of
us believes that Hamilton has correctly described the type of judiciary, the type of judges, that we
live with today.”); Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L. & POL. 239, 247–
53 (2011) (discussing the influence of the rise of the indeterminacy difficulty on the decline in the
belief in legal expertise).
236. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 24, 58 (“[T]he root idea is that the process [of judicial review]
is justified only if it injects into representative government something that is not already there;
and that is principle . . . .”); id. at 68 (“The constitutional function of the Court is to define values
and proclaim principles.”); id. at 188; BICKEL, supra note 176, at 175 (“The judicial process is
too principle-prone and principle-bound—it has to be, there is no other justification or
explanation for the role it plays.”).
237. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 227, at 98; BERGER, supra note 74, at 8–9, 18.
238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 220, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton); see also
CHOPER, supra note 34, at 140.
239. Friedman, supra note 101, at 623 (“Not only did the Framers call the Supreme Court the
‘least dangerous’ branch, but its prestige seemed to mirror this assessment of its power.”
(footnote omitted)).
240. Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1750 & n.161 (2001); William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: The First
Hundred Years Were the Hardest, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 477–78 (1988).
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to Virginia’s attack on the judgment, Marshall wrote (under a pseudonym),
“[t]he judicial department, being without power, without patronage, without
the legitimate means of ingratiating itself with the people, forms the weakest
part.”241
But after a while, the doubts regarding the Court’s ability to acquire public
support were “dispelled.”242 In the current era, consistent empirical data
demonstrates that since the 1970s, the public, though disagreeing at times with
specific judgments, has mostly awarded the Court with a steady and relatively
high level of confidence.243
One may argue that the difference between Hamilton’s famous dictum and
Frankfurter’s less famous one is merely a difference of paraphrasing of the
same truism. On the one hand, allegedly every institution requires public
confidence to function properly. This was a well-known premise even at the
time Hamilton wrote the Federalist No. 78.244 Even with regards to the Court,
it was known well before the invention of scientific public polling that its
power “is moral, not physical; it operates by its influence, by public confidence
in the soundness and uniformity of the principles on which it acts.”245 On the
other hand, to recruit public confidence, the Court must rely on its expertise.
After all, it lacks the sword and the purse. Thus, even at the time of the
framers, so the claim goes, it was well understood that the basis of the Court’s
power is public confidence, and the way to gain that confidence was through
demonstrating expertise.246

241. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 83.
242. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 1, at 129–30 (“Indeed, Jefferson, when writing to the
Justices for their advisory opinion, spoke for a President who wanted their support because ‘their
authority [would] insure the respect of all parties.’ The Court’s high ‘degree of credit’ is a fact of
life, and has been at least since McCulloch v. Maryland was decided . . . .”).
243. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring
Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 355 tbl.1 (2003).
244. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787,
at 135 (1972) (“In classical Whig thought all rulers, whether English kings or Venetian doges,
supposedly derived their powers ultimately from the people; election only made explicit what was
always implicit.”); id. at 612 (discussing the eighteenth century view that all power was “derived
from public opinion”).
245. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 618 (1840); see also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 223 (1882) (“While by the Constitution the judicial department is recognized as one of the
three great branches among which all the powers and functions of the government are distributed,
it is inherently the weakest of them all. . . . [W]ith no patronage and no control of the purse or the
sword, their power and influence rest solely upon the public sense of the necessity for the
existence of a tribunal to which all may appeal for the assertion and protection of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and by the laws of the land, and on the confidence reposed in the
soundness of their decisions and the purity of their motives.”).
246. Moreover, some scholars suggest that during the early days of the Republic, the Court’s
power was based on adherence to public opinion. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 60–63 (2004) (“Not
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Yet exactly here lies the explanatory power of the distinction between the
two CM difficulties, as it allows us to flesh out an important and delicate
insight on the basis of the Court’s power. According to the “merely judgment”
thesis, the basis of the Court’s power is grounded in the Justices’ expertise in
applying a justification theory. The emphasis is on the Court’s adherence to
the directive of its expert knowledge.247 Public confidence in the Court is
assumed to be a mere contingent byproduct of such adherence.248 Moreover,
as long as the executive is persuaded by the Court’s expertise and the system
of governance as a whole possesses public confidence, public support of the
Court is immaterial.249 The Constitutional Court of South Africa seems to
present a current example of a court which lacks public confidence and whose
power relies on its ability to persuade the dominant political party of its legal
expertise. As Theunis Roux explains, in view of the domination of a single
political party in South Africa, the Constitutional Court can function properly
over time even without public confidence.250 The Constitutional Court can
ignore public opinion as a limit to its adherence to legal expertise, provided
that the dominant political party is persuaded that the Constitutional Court
adheres to the directive of legal expertise.251

everyone agreed that judicial enforcement of a constitution was improper, however. . . . [C]ourts
must exercise judicial review because they are the people’s agents too. . . . In refusing to enforce
unconstitutional laws, judges were exercising the people’s authority to resist . . . .”); id. at 80–82,
91–92 (“If judicial review was to occur, it would be . . . a ‘political-legal’ act, a substitute for
popular resistance . . . .”); Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 49, 54 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997) (“[In the Federalist No. 78,]
Hamilton implied . . . that the judges, though not elected, resembled the legislators and executives
in being agents or servants of the people with a responsibility equal to that of the other two
branches of government to carry out the people’s will, even to the point of sharing in the making
of law.”); see also id. at 49, 58.
247. Cf. PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 127 (1997) (“Courts make a claim to knowledge that founds their
power.”).
248. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 (1921)
(“Only experts perhaps may be able to gauge the quality of his work and appraise its significance.
But their judgment, the judgment of the lawyer class, will spread to others, and tinge the common
consciousness and the common faith.”).
249. Fiss, supra note 59, at 38 (“Legitimacy does not depend on popular approval of the
institution’s performance . . . . It is the legitimacy of the political system as a whole that depends
on the people’s approval, and that is the source of its democratic character.”).
250. Theunis Roux, Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 7
INT’L J. CONST. L. 106, 106–12, 118–23 (2009).
251. Id. at 120 (arguing that the Court made clear in its second case that “its claim to
legitimacy would be based on strict adherence to the law/politics distinction”); id. at 138 (noting
“the CCSA’s reputation for legally credible decision making lending . . . the ANC government’s
continued respect for, and obedience to, the CCSA’s decisions”).
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Indeed, scholars today are too quick in switching from Hamilton’s dictum
to the conclusion that the Court’s power is based on public confidence.252
They thus fail to detect the shift in the understanding of the Court’s power that
is partly the result of the rise of the opinion polls culture.
In the era before the invention of public opinion polls, all the Court had
was indeed “mere” expertise. Besides elections, no other source of data could
give direct, regular, and reliable measurements of public opinion.253 The
public attitude toward the Court could have been deduced only indirectly, in a
crude and inexact manner from the rare occasions when the Court was an issue
in national presidential campaigns.254 As long as the elected branches were
perceived as the central representation of public opinion, their attacks on the
Court have served as the major informative signal on the Court’s waning
public support.255 The elected players could thus always claim to hold public
support for their position and there was no accepted public indicator to repute
their claim.256 Even if the Court was perceived at some historical periods as the

252. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 157, at 67 (“Indeed, at least since Alexander Hamilton
wrote in Federalist #78 that the Court is ‘possessed of neither force nor will, but merely
judgment,’ students of American government have recognized that the Court is limited in its
efficacy by the necessity of public and political will to give its decisions force.”).
253. ROBERT S. ERIKSON, NORMAN R. LUTTBEG & KENT L. TEDIN, AMERICAN PUBLIC
OPINION: ITS ORIGINS, CONTENT, AND IMPACT 23 (2d ed. 1980) (“Before the advent of public
opinion polls in the early 1930s, one had to rely on much more inexact measures of what the
public was thinking. . . . But the most relied upon method of assessing public opinion prior to the
opinion poll was the interpretation of election results, and the occasional referendum that
managed to find its way onto the ballot.”); ADAM J. BERINSKY, SILENT VOICES: PUBLIC OPINION
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 6 (2004) (“At an empirical level, there is a general
agreement on one point among academics and professionals, be they proponents or opponents of
the polling enterprise: opinion polls are broadly representative of popular sentiment.”).
254. See Rosenberg, supra note 155, at 380, 384–86 (stating the 1860, 1896, 1924 and 1964
presidential campaigns at least partly focused on the proper role for the Court); see also OWEN M.
FISS, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF
THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 3–5 (2006) (noting the Court has been a major subject in the
presidential elections of 1896 and 1912); FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 177–80 (arguing that
during the Lochner period, “[j]udicial Review was a major issue in three presidential
campaigns”). Friedman’s three are the 1896, 1912, and 1924 elections. Id. at 177–80.
255. CLARK, supra note 157, at 71, 80, 255–56 (“[S]pecifically, I have sought to demonstrate
that congressional attacks on the Court can be interpreted as institutional signals about public
opinion.”).
256. For example, in 1935, Arthor Krock reported that based on “letters” sent to President
Roosevelt by private citizens, FDR had “strong evidence that a vast aggregation of people do not
think that the Supreme Court…has either the legal or moral right” to thwart the administration’s
decision to regulate money in a certain manner. Arthur Krock, Gold Ruling Effects Weighed at
Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1935, at E3. In a reality in which public opinion polls are
considered as the authoritative democratic legitimator and these polls show strong public support
for the Court, such inference would be unavailable.
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people’s delegate and the Justices were seen as representatives of the people,257
no independent public indicator could confirm this claim to public legitimacy
when a clash with the elected branches occurred.
The ability to track public support for the Court, the public record of this
support (often published by popular media), and the scientific allure of opinion
polls made public confidence in the Court more “real” in public imagination.258
The existence of a metric measuring public support of the Court, a metric that
is central to political players’ own understanding of their power,259 opened new
paths for understanding the Court’s basis of power. Now the political branches
may enforce the Court’s decisions not due to its expertise—as if they were the
patient doing as the doctor ordered260—but due to the public support of the
Court.261 Indeed, even when the Court is perceived to act politically i.e., not
according to its expertise, as long as it holds public confidence, political
resistance to its decisions seems unfeasible. Public opinion is the drive wheel
of American politics, and no politician wants to stand against it.262

257. See for example during the early days of the republic: WOOD, supra note 244, at 161
(“[M]ost of the early constitution-makers had little sense that judicial independence meant
independence from the people.”); id. at 448–49, 456, 460 (describing the position that “[t]he
judges were in a sense as much agents of the people as the legislator”); id. at 546–49, 598
(“Therefore all governmental officials, including even the executive and judicial parts of the
government were agents of the people, not fundamentally different from the people’s nominal
representatives in the lower houses of the legislatures.”); STEPHEN M. ENGEL, AMERICAN
POLITICIANS CONFRONT THE COURT: OPPOSITION POLITICS AND CHANGING RESPONSES TO
JUDICIAL POWER 72, 99, 133, 74–77 (2011) (“Taking the Constitution to be an artifact of popular
sovereignty and judges as representatives of the people are cornerstones of judicial review’s
original legitimacy.”); id. at 84–85 (noting that during the Founding generation, the dominant
understanding was the “judicial interpretation should accord with the popular will since the
Constitution is, by definition, an act of popular sovereignty”); id. at 104, 282.
258. See, e.g., Fried & Harris, supra note 14, at 323 (arguing that public opinion itself became
more “real” making it a political source of legitimacy).
259. See Zizi Papacharissi, The Virtual Sphere 2.0: The Internet, the Public Sphere, and
Beyond, in ROUTELDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNET POLITICS 230, 233 (Andrew Chadwick &
Philip N. Howard eds., 2009) (“[P]oliticians, opinion leaders, and the media frequently rely on
aggregations of public opinion obtained through polls . . . .”).
260. Cf. Peters (1995), supra note 12, at 5 (“Even today judges and physicians render legal or
medical opinions: we are to understand that deciding a case or diagnosing an illness are acts of
expert judgment, not of guaranteed truth. To give an opinion, one must be an authority.”); KAHN,
supra note 247, at 126 (“A judge’s knowledge of the rule of law functions analogously to a
doctor’s knowledge of health. . . . Power flows from knowledge . . . .”).
261. See Georg Vanberg, Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to
Constitutional Review, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 346, 351–52 (2001).
262. See JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: HOW PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES AMERICAN
POLITICS xv–xvii (2004) (“Public opinion matters. . . . Its power is that it points always to the
future, telling those whose careers and strategies depend on public support that success depends
on being with the tide, not against it.”).
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In the view of these changes, the Court may try to maintain its power as an
institution by dissolving the CM difficulty in its literal sense. In a reality in
which the public has partly lost its belief in Justices as legal experts,263
adhering to public opinion rather than to the directives of an expertise-based
justification theory may seem as the only viable tactic to ensure that the Court
can maintain its public support.264 Indeed, deciding according to the directives
of expertise-based justification theory does not necessarily bring public
support, especially if the public has lost its faith in legal expertise. At times,
deviating from the correct expert “judgment” may be the only way to ensure
public support. Justice Frankfurter fiercely objected to the idea of a Court
directed by public opinion, naming it “despotic,”265 yet his idea of “public
confidence” as the source of the Court’s power may lead in the end to judicial
capitulation to public opinion.
VII. THE CM DIFFICULTY IN ITS LITERAL SENSE GOES ABROAD
One of the few truisms in the field of comparative constitutionalism is that
the scholarly obsession with the CM difficulty is a uniquely American
phenomenon.266 It is not as important, so the claim goes, to the constitutional

263. Bassok, supra note 235, at 247–53 (describing the erosion in public perception of the
Court’s expertise); Suzanna Sherry, Democracy’s Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline of
Expertise, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 7, 11 (2011) (“[M]any people no longer see judges as possessing
legal expertise.”).
264. Cf. ENGEL, supra note 257, at 15 (“[T]he Court has recently striven to justify its
authority of majoritarian grounds. Justices have emphasized the democratic credentials of their
holdings, stressing how they follow majoritarian trends, however defined, evident in the broader
polity.”); id. at 282 (Due to the decline of the belief in a fix and singular legal meaning, “the
Court seemed to lose any special claim to interpretive authority.”); Friedman, supra note 101, at
601 (“At any rate, examining the sources of constitutional decision makes increasingly apparent
the extent to which judges seek to appeal to majoritarian values, if not to rely upon them
entirely.”); Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution of
Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 40 (1993)
(explaining that “[t]he joint opinion in Casey” that focused on the decision’s effects on the public
support of the Court, “may also be symptomatic of a crisis of legitimacy in constitutional thought
in which the generally accepted paradigms and modes of thought are no longer felt capable of
yielding convincing solutions to constitutional questions”).
265. Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 557 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“Mr. Dooley’s ‘th’ Supreme Coort follows th’ iliction returns’ expressed the wit of
cynicism, not the demand of principle. A court which yields to the popular will thereby licenses
itself to practice despotism, for there can be no assurance that it will not on another occasion
indulge its own will.”).
266. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review—and Why
It May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2779–80 (2003) (“Americans grapple with, but
never finally resolve, the ‘countermajoritarian’ problem . . . . European constitutions expressly
provide for review and for the supremacy of constitutional courts with respect to constitutional
interpretation. European academics and constitutional judges will state as much in one breath,
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discourse in other countries where national high courts play a central role.267
The distinction between the two CM difficulties exposes that while the
traditional difficulty may indeed play only a marginal role in the scholarly
debates over the role of national high courts outside of the United States,268 the
CM difficulty in its literal sense is very much present in those debates.
Current comparative theories present the worldwide phenomenon of
judicial empowerment as the work of political, economic, and judicial elites
securing their interests over the preferences of the multitude.269 Based on
“bottom-up” inquiry, Ran Hirschl argues that political elites, in association
with economic and judicial elites, support constitutionalization and the shift
towards “juristocracy” in order to preserve or enhance their political

and then move on to more interesting issues.”); Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and
Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1996–97, 2002 (2004) (“While there of course
remains anxiety in Europe about judicial overreaching in constitutional matters, the idea that
constitutional law as such faces a fundamental theoretical difficulty in explaining its own
democratic legitimacy—particularly in explaining the democratic legitimacy of countermajoritarian judicial review—no longer has nearly as much bite in Europe as it does in America.”
(footnote omitted)); SADURSKI, supra note 167, at xiii (“Continental constitutional courts do not,
therefore, feel any special reasons for anxiety about their own legitimacy when deciding on the
constitutionality of statutes.”); Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the
United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM: SCIENCE
AND TECHNIQUE OF DEMOCRACY 165, 191 (Council of Eur. ed., 2005) (“As Dieter Grimm, a
former justice on the German Constitutional Court, emphasizes, ‘. . . the counter-majoritarian
difficulty, the perennial problem of American constitutional law, plays no role in Germany.’”
(citation omitted)).
267. See, e.g., Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY
L.J. 837, 843 (1991) (“[T]he so-called ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty,’ the term Alexander
Bickel used to describe the root problem of judicial review in America, is not a major problem in
Germany.”).
268. The traditional difficulty is present in the debate over the power of regional courts such
as the European Court of Justice. However, the term used to describe the problem of
unaccountability, at least in the European context, is “democratic deficit” rather than the CM
difficulty.
269. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 11–12, 16, 37–40, 43–44, 47–49, 98–99, 169–172, 199, 210–218
(2004) (arguing that elites seek to insulate their policy preferences from the vicissitudes of
democratic politics); ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES
1, 8–9 (2003); TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 18, 24–26, 30–33 (2003) (arguing that judicial review in new
democracies is created by political elites that, at the time democratization occurs, foresee
themselves losing in elections and thus seek to entrench judicial review as a form of “political
insurance”); Rogers M. Smith, Judicial Power and Democracy: A Machiavellian View, in THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 199, 204–07 (Steven Kautz, et al. eds.,
2009) (“Powerful judiciaries are at bottom not partners of modern democracy, but efforts by elites
to retain hegemony within them, as a Machiavellian analysis would lead us to expect.”).
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hegemony.270 Since public support for the policy preferences of the elites is
weakening, these threatened elites transfer power from majoritarian decisionmaking arenas to unelected institutions such as national high courts thus
ensuring the preservation of their hegemony.271
Robert Bork contends that courts are “enacting the agenda of the cultural
left” in “the culture war in every Western nation” against the “great mass of
citizens who, left to their own devices, tend to be traditionalists.”272 Being a
“political minority,” the cultural left, or as Bork titles them the “New Class,”273
loses elections. Hence, in order “to avoid the verdict of the ballot box,” and in
order to “outflank majorities and nullify their votes,” the “New Class”
empowers national high courts that tend to adopt the values of these elites.274
Hirschl and Bork agree that as a descriptive matter, in the countries they
examined, national high courts have entrenched the policies of the elites
against public preferences. These courts thus decide in a literally CM fashion.
Thus, while Hirschl is correct in arguing that his juristocracy theory is not
preoccupied “with the well-rehearsed normative debate over the
‘countermajoritarian’ nature of judicial review,”275 his theory, as well as
Bork’s, is modeled according to the CM difficulty in its literal sense. Hirschl
describes courts deciding cases contrary to the majority’s will.
Bork and Hirschl mainly disagree on the values that guide the elites in their
endeavor to transfer fundamental public, political and moral disputes to courts.
While Hirschl claims that judicial empowerment is an “institutional solution”
for promoting a neo-liberal agenda of “open markets, economic deregulation,
anti-statism, and anticollectivism,”276 Bork argues that judicial empowerment

270. HIRSCHL, supra note 269, at 11; see also id. at 75, 78, 80–81 (Canada), 88–89 (New
Zealand), 92–95 (South Africa).
271. Id. at 12, 16, 40 (“Accordingly, a strategic, political-power-oriented explanation for
voluntary, self-imposed judicial empowerment through the constitutionalization of rights and the
establishment of judicial review suggests that political power-holders who either initiate or refrain
from blocking such reforms estimate that it enhances their absolute or relative political power visà-vis rival political actors.”); id. at 49, 98–99.
272. BORK, supra note 269, at 2 (describing the struggle between the “elite” and “the general
public”).
273. Id. at 5–6.
274. Id. (“The judiciary is the liberals’ weapon of choice.”); id. at 9–10 (“The ideas and
values of the New Class are part of the furniture of most judges’ minds and seem self-evident.”);
id. at 109 (“[T]hey are speaking for values of the New Class that have not yet found, and perhaps
never can find, favor in the legislature.”).
275. HIRSCHL, supra note 269, at 3 (emphasis added).
276. Id. at 12, 43–44 (arguing that elites promote through the judiciary an agenda of
“[r]elative cosmopolitanism, open markets, formal equality, and Lockean-style individual
autonomy”); id. at 118 (“All four national high courts . . . fortify and expand the boundaries of the
private sphere . . .”); id. at 146–48.
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is actually aimed to promote the values of “eclectic socialism” held by “the
cultural or liberal left.”277
But here is the puzzle: While these and other leading accounts explain the
rise of judicial power as an elite endeavor against the populus, opinion polls
consistently show that many national high courts receive high public support as
institutions.278 If national high courts act in the name of elites “insulating
policy making in general, and their policy preferences in particular, from the
vicissitudes of democratic politics,”279 how is it that these courts have received
over a long period of time such high public institutional support? If these
courts have been preserving the interests of elites whose public support is
eroding,280 if “an activist judiciary helps to advance the ends that democratic
branches of government would never sanction,”281 how do these courts succeed
277. BORK, supra note 269, at 2–3, 8 (“In a word, courts in general have enlisted on the
liberal side of the culture war. They are infected, as is the New Class to which judges belong and
to which they respond, with the socialist impulse.”); id. at 10 (“Everywhere judicial review has
taken root, activist courts enforce New Class values, shifting the culture steadily to the left.”); id.
at 31 (“The Left wants expanded judicial review in the name of rights . . . .”).
278. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of
National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 344 (1998) (surveying data on public support
of national high courts from eighteen countries); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH
JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 139 (2000) (noting that in Europe constitutional
courts have high “institutional legitimacy”); SADURSKI, supra note 167, at 33 (“[It] is
indisputable that the constitutional courts in the region discussed here [Central and Eastern
Europe] enjoy a high level of social acceptance, despite occasional disagreements with and
criticisms of particular decisions. They do not, therefore, have a problem with ‘legitimacy’ in the
sense of a general public acceptance of their authority to do what they are doing—including the
invalidation of statutes.”); Law, supra note 21, at 791 (“In [the US] and elsewhere, courts known
for striking down supposedly majoritarian legislation have nevertheless enjoyed high levels of
public support that put other government institutions to shame.”); F.L. MORTON & RAINER
KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION & THE COURT PARTY 17 (2000) (“In the [1987 and 1999
national surveys in Canada], 62 per cent expressed greater confidence in courts and judges than in
legislatures and politicians when it came to having the final say on rights issues.”). However, as
noted above, the Constitutional Court of South Africa enjoys a very low level of public support.
Roux, supra note 250, at 107. While Bork and Hirschl do not examine courts in Latin America, it
is interesting to note that the rise in judicial power in Latin America has occurred while these
courts suffer from a low level of public support. See Gretchen Helmke, Public Support and
Judicial Crises in Latin America, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 397, 398 (2010) (“One of the most
widely touted facts about the rule of law gap in Latin America is how poorly the public regards
the judiciary.”); GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURT UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS, AND
PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA 1–2 (2005) (“[In Latin America], judges today are less popular than
presidents, the military, or the police. . . . Latin America’s courts have become vitally important
political institutions.”).
279. HIRSCHL, supra note 269, at 11–12; see also id. at 98–99; BORK, supra note 269, at 6
(“Democracy and the rule of law are undermined while culture is altered in ways the electorate
would never chose.”).
280. HIRSCHL, supra note 269, at 12.
281. BORK, supra note 269, at 11; see also id. at 77–78 (referring to the U.S. Supreme Court).
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in preserving their public support over a long period of time? In other words,
if national high courts consistently decide cases against public preferences, i.e.
deciding literally in a CM fashion, how is it that these courts remain
majoritarian institutions in the literal sense? This fascinating puzzle has yet to
receive any elaborate scholarly attention.282
CONCLUSION: THE TWO CM DIFFICULTIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The introduction of public opinion polls created substantial changes in
American political thought.283 The manner in which we understand the CM
difficulty is a vivid example of these changes. For many years, the clash
between constitutionalism and popular sovereignty, also known as the CM
difficulty, was understood as a problem of unaccountable judges who
invalidate legislation enacted by electorally accountable representatives.
Opinion polling introduced quantitative results of opinion surveys as a new
form of popular sovereignty.284 As a result, in recent years, constitutional
scholars have attempted to discard any understanding of the difficulty which
cannot be measured. Thus, many of them, influenced by social science studies
of the Court, formulate the difficulty in completely measurable terms, as a
clash between public opinion, measured in opinion polls and the Court’s
decisions.285 This formulation of the difficulty reduces popular sovereignty to
mere responsiveness to public opinion and dismantles the presumed connection
between popularly elected legislators and majority will.286 It fits well the
American tendency, stretching back to the early days of the republic, of

282. One answer to this puzzle is “give it time.” According to this answer, it takes time for the
public to digest the change in the courts’ function. As soon as the public acknowledges the shift,
public confidence in the courts will decline rapidly. Another explanation is “blame the media.”
According to this explanation, the media presents the rise of judicial power as a positive
development thus effecting public perception. Both of these explanations are backed by the
Israeli experience. The Israeli Supreme Court, that served as “exhibit A” in many of the accounts
on the rise of judicial power, has experienced in recent years a sharp decline in its public support.
For an elaboration of these and other explanations in the Israeli case see Or Bassok, Television
Coverage of the Israeli Supreme Court 1968–1992: The Persistence of the Mythical Image, 42
ISR. L. REV. 306, 307–08 (2009); MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL
154–169 (2011).
283. Cf. JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY
91–92 (1995) (arguing that the American political system was transformed by a new method of
assessing public attitudes, i.e. the opinion polling).
284. SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 6 (2003).
285. See PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 12 (2011) (“In place of the popular sovereign, the political scientist today speaks
of popular majorities and of the forces that effect electoral politics—all measurable entities.”).
286. See GINSBURG, supra note 269, at 1 (“The superior position of the popularly elected
legislature and its corollary of majority rule have been central principles for democratic
revolutionaries since the notion was appended to the unwritten English constitution.”).
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understanding democracy in populist and majoritarian terms.287 In the current
“public opinion culture,” the role of majority opinion, as measured by public
polls, has become even more central. Now it is indeed “the master of servants
who tremble before it.”288
While many constitutional theorists continue to devise normative
justifications for judicial review,289 other theorists have taken a new path.
Dissolving the CM difficulty became a major tactic for confronting the
difficulty.290 Rather than conceptualizing the difficulty as an inherent
normative question concerning the Court’s authority, these theorists view the
CM difficulty as a question concerning the Court’s actual performance.291 As
long as the Court’s decisions correspond to public opinion, no difficulty exists.
Thus, the debate over democratic legitimacy is focused not on the justifications
for the institution’s decisions but on the way public opinion responds to
highly-salient decisions taken by the institution.292
Fifty years ago, Alexander Bickel identified the dangers lurking for a
Court that capitulates to public opinion. In response, he suggested the device
of “passive virtues” that enables the Court to avoid the most volatile
controversies. Today, in view of the current focus on the literal CM difficulty,
other techniques, such as “stealth overruling” of highly salient precedents, are

287. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 244, at 362, 368–69; Steven Barnett, Distorting
Democracy: Public Opinions, Polls, and the Press, in PUBLIC OPINION & DEMOCRACY VOX
POPULI-VOX DEI?, supra note 12, at 287, 288–90; ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE,
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 17
(2012) (arguing that constitutional democracy in the US seeks to instantiate the value of selfgovernment by rendering government decisions responsive to public opinion); CHOPER, supra
note 34, at 2 (“[J]udicial review is incompatible with a fundamental precept of American
democracy—majority rule . . . .”); id. at 4–5.
288. BRYCE, supra note 86, at 267, 923 (“[P]ublic opinion stands out, in the United States, as
the great source of power, the master of servants who tremble before it.”); see also Jeff Manza,
Fay Lomax Cook & Benjamin I. Page, Navigating Public Opinion: An Introduction, in
NAVIGATING PUBLIC OPINION: POLLS, POLICY, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3,
4 (Jeff Manza, Fay Lomax Cook & Benjamin I. Page eds., 2002) (surveying commentators that
criticize the development of “poll driven leadership”).
289. See, e.g., Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV. 991
(2006).
290. See, e.g., Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755, 757 (2011)
(“Today’s external legal history is marred by . . . ‘consensus constitutionalism,’ the claim that the
Supreme Court interprets the Constitution in a manner that reflects the ‘consensus’ views of the
American public.”).
291. Cf. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE
MODERN STATE 173 (2005) (“[Q]uestions about the origins or constitution of the state tend to
fade from view, to be replaced with questions about its day-to-day performance.”).
292. Cf. id. at 174 (arguing that currently the debate over legitimacy is conducted in terms of
performance rather than origins).
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surfacing.293 Indeed, in a sense the shift in scholarly emphasis from the
traditional difficulty to the literal difficulty is merely a shift from the first part
of The Least Dangerous Branch to the book’s second part.

293. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda
v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 1, 4–5, 29, 33, 46–50, 62–63 (2010) (arguing that, fearful the
overruling of a precedent would hinder the Court’s public support, Justices overruled it under the
public radar in order to avoid publicity and, thus, public scrutiny).

